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ABSTRACT 
This article argues for a constitutional right to counsel for state inmates in all initial federal 
habeas corpus proceedings based on access-to-the-courts doctrine.  The doctrine guarantees an 
indigent inmate a constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts in incarceration-related 
litigation, including post-conviction proceedings.  The Supreme Court initially articulated the 
access right, in relevant part, as merely prohibiting states from actively interfering with an 
indigent inmate’s efforts at pursuing post-conviction relief from a criminal judgment.  Today, 
though still fairly inscrutable in dimension, the access right has evolved to require states in certain 
circumstances to provide affirmative assistance to inmates to ensure constitutionally adequate 
access to the writ.   
In Pennsylvania v. Finley1 and Murray v. Giarratano,2 a pair of decisions rendered in 1987 
and 1989, respectively, the Supreme Court held that the right of access does not require assistance 
of counsel in either noncapital or capital state post-conviction proceedings, at least insofar as the 
inmate seeks to raise claims litigated on direct appeal.  The primary rationale in Finley and 
Giarrantano was that habeas litigants have enjoyed assistance of counsel at trial and on direct 
appeal, and thus should be able simply to parrot that work product in the federal habeas forum to 
obtain judicial review of any cognizable claims.   The Court analogized to an earlier case, Ross v. 
Moffitt,3 in which it had held no right to counsel attaches in discretionary appeals.  The Court 
has never addressed the issue whether the access right demands assistance of counsel in federal 
habeas proceedings.  But the lack of such right appeared a foregone conclusion after Finley and 
Giarratano. 
On April 24, 1996, however, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which introduced a myriad of exceedingly complex procedural requirements -- 
most significantly, a one-year statute of limitations -- that a petitioner must satisfy in order to 
obtain merits review of claims set forth in a federal habeas petition.  For the prototypical pro se 
habeas litigant, these requirements, in particular the statute of limitations, erected an impenetrable 
wall around federal judicial review of merits claims.  Indeed, the effect of AEDPA’s enactment has 
been to stymie many pro se inmates’ efforts at obtaining federal habeas review of state court 
judgments.  Yet, to date, the Supreme Court has not recognized a right to counsel in federal habeas 
corpus.  Federal courts, while struggling mightily to make sense of a poorly drafted statute, 
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continue to abide by a literal fiction in assuming that most inmates are sufficiently competent to 
navigate post-AEDPA federal habeas practice without assistance of counsel. 
This article argues that absent constitutionally guaranteed assistance of counsel in federal habeas 
corpus and a concomitant remedy where that assistance falls short, AEDPA’s procedural 
intricacies function to deny the indigent, pro se state inmate the right to meaningful access to the 
courts in federal habeas proceedings.  As such, absent repeal of AEDPA, the access right requires 
recognition of a right to assistance of counsel in filing a first federal petition.  This right would 
extend only to navigating and comprehending the procedural complexity of federal habeas under 
AEDPA, rather than to the articulation and framing of substantive claims and subsequent 
litigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The impetus for this Article derives from my work as a staff attor-
ney with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, where I was responsible 
for reviewing requests for certificates of appealability, which are re-
quired by statute in order to appeal district court denials of federal 
habeas corpus petitions, and making recommendations to motions 
panels regarding whether the certificates should issue.  This work re-
quired my review of federal petitions and the district court rulings.  
In the more than four years I spent at the court, I reviewed and pre-
sented to motions panels over 800 petitions.  Virtually all of these pe-
titions were prepared pro se, often handwritten on court-issued forms 
or typed out on old typewriters.  As a lawyer with substantial expe-
rience in the federal criminal justice system,4 by far the most chal-
lenging issues for me to unpack were procedural in nature.  Difficul-
ties frequently emerged from the thin language of the governing 
statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2253–2255, as amended by the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),5 and the 
number of unresolved questions that have resulted.  Typically, once—
or rather, if—the litigant cleared the procedural hurdles, the appro-
priate disposition of the merits of a particular petition became readily 
apparent.  Throughout this work, I never ceased to be astonished by 
the legal expectation, grounded in the absence of a recognized right 
to counsel in federal habeas corpus proceedings, that inmates navi-
gate AEDPA’s complexity successfully in order to obtain judicial re-
view of the merits of their claims.  In the trial context, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that “[w]hile a criminal trial is not a game in 
which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near 
match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladia-
tors.”6  What I witnessed in federal habeas practice for non-capital, 
pro se litigants is precisely such a slaughter. 
 
 4 Prior to working at the Ninth Circuit, I spent a year clerking on that court, two years as an 
Attorney-Advisor at the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, where I pro-
vided legal advice to the Executive Branch primarily on criminal procedure issues, and 
five years as a trial and appellate lawyer with the Federal Public Defender’s Office in Los 
Angeles. 
 5 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(1996). 
 6 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 (1984) (internal citation omitted).  In Cronic, 
the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s presumption of ineffectiveness where a young and 
inexperienced trial counsel had only twenty-five days to prepare a complex, serious case 
and some witnesses were not easily accessible.  Id. at 664–65. 
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Indeed, statistics bear out my experience.  A recent study con-
ducted by Vanderbilt Law School found that over 90% of non-capital 
habeas cases involve pro se litigants.  Moreover, district courts dismiss 
as untimely more than one in five non-capital cases, the vast majority 
of which are uncounseled.  In practice, without assistance of counsel, 
AEDPA has shrouded the Great Writ7 in an impenetrable fog, leaving 
merits review of claims that a state inmate raises in a federal petition 
to little more than the fortuity of access to a competent jailhouse law-
yer. 
The instant Article argues that AEDPA’s procedural intricacies, 
coupled with a lack of a constitutional right to assistance of counsel, 
function to deny the indigent, pro se state inmate the right to mea-
ningful access to the courts in pursuit of the Great Writ.  As such, ab-
sent repeal of AEDPA, the access right should require recognition of 
a right to assistance of counsel for state inmates in filing a first federal 
petition.  Because a right to counsel requires effective assistance of 
counsel, petitioners would have a meaningful remedy should counsel 
be unavailable or render ineffective assistance in apprehending the 
procedural strictures of the AEDPA.  In this way, we can begin to 
clear a path through AEDPA’s procedural thicket for the indigent 
habeas petitioner and ensure the constitutional guarantee of mea-
ningful access to judicial review. 
In practical consequence, the proposal is a radical one.  States 
have fallen far short in realizing Gideon v. Wainwright’s8 decades-old 
promise of a right to counsel at trial.9  Thus, to imagine a right to 
counsel in federal habeas may seem both decadent and unrealistic.  
But it is precisely because Gideon’s dream has not fully materialized 
that habeas corpus occupies such a crucial role in our criminal justice 
system.  Without an effective, accessible habeas writ, inmates who suf-
fer at the hands of incompetent trial or appellate counsel are at best, 
lost to the system; at worst, they lose their lives.  Beyond the personal 
cost to those directly affected, we, as a society, are left with the stain 
of that injustice. 
 
7  The federal writ of habeas corpus is commonly referred to as the “Great Writ of Liberty” 
(or simply, the “Great Writ”), which is the term that dates to the Magna Charta. See gener-
ally LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS HABEAS CORPUS 14–15 (2003). 
 8 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (recognizing indigent state criminal 
defendants’ right to assistance of counsel at trial). 
 9 See generally Bruce R. Jacob, Memories of and Reflections About Gideon v. Wainwright, 33 
STETSON L. REV. 181, 290 (2003) (noting “an ongoing struggle in the United States be-
tween the constitutional ideal of assigned counsel for indigents and its actual implemen-
tation in practice”). 
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This Article is structured as follows:  Part I identifies the problem, 
i.e., the lack of a constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas 
corpus and the near impenetrability of post-AEDPA federal habeas 
practice for pro se litigants.  Part II sets forth the access-to-the-courts 
doctrine as a framework for recognition of a constitutional right to 
counsel in federal habeas.  Part III applies the access doctrine to 
AEDPA, arguing that the right to meaningful access demands assis-
tance of counsel in navigating AEDPA’s procedural thicket.  Lastly, 
Part IV explores different models for implementation of an access-
based right to counsel in federal habeas corpus. 
I.  THE PROBLEM:  THE IMPOSSIBLE TASK OF NAVIGATING AEDPA’S 
PROCEDURAL MORASS WITHOUT ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
A. The Lack of a Recognized Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal 
Habeas Proceedings 
To date, the Supreme Court has only recognized a constitutional 
right to counsel for the criminally accused at trial10 and on the first 
direct appeal of right.11  This right extends to all felony defendants as 
well as misdemeanor defendants who face a potential loss of life or 
liberty.12  Moreover, the right to counsel at trial extends to all “critical 
stages of the proceedings” against the defendant, and not merely to 
the trial itself.13  But the Court has declined to recognize a constitu-
tional right to counsel in seeking discretionary review before a state’s 
 
 10 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (recognizing a Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel for federal criminal defendants facing loss of life or liberty); Powell v. Alabama, 
287 U.S. 45, 65–66, 71 (1932) (recognizing Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to 
counsel for capital defendants); see also Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345 (extending Powell to non-
capital criminal defendants). 
 11 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356–58 (1963) (recognizing due process and 
equal protection right to counsel on first appeal). 
 12 See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002) (recognizing right to counsel in misde-
meanor cases even where sentencing court suspends a prison or jail sentence and impos-
es probation); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 743 n.9 (1994) (noting in dicta that, 
for felony cases, the right to counsel does not depend on potential incarceration); Scott v. 
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (finding that whether an indigent defendant has the 
right to appointment of counsel under Gideon depends on the ultimate sanction im-
posed); see also Jacob, supra note 9, at 280 (explaining that the Court’s holdings in Gideon 
and Douglas entitle indigent defendants to state-appointed counsel at trial and for the first 
appeal of right). 
 13 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235–37 (1967) (concluding that post-indictment 
lineup is a critical stage of prosecution, and thus, the right to counsel attaches); see also 
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187–88 (1984) (holding that the right to counsel 
attaches at preliminary hearing and arraignment only if certain rights are at risk, but at-
taches unconditionally at sentencing). 
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supreme court or in filing a petition for writ of certiorari before the 
United States Supreme Court.14 
Thus far, the Supreme Court has also declined to recognize a con-
stitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings, at 
least insofar as the petitioner seeks to raise claims previously litigated 
at trial or on appeal.15  As I will discuss in greater depth in Part II, in 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, decided in 1987, the Court rejected a claim that 
the constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts requires 
assistance of counsel in state, non-capital habeas proceedings.16  Ra-
ther, the Court held that a pro se inmate’s access to the trial record 
and the appellate briefs and opinions suffice to provide meaningful 
access to the courts for post-conviction litigation.17  Thus, as with dis-
cretionary appeals, no constitutional right to counsel attaches during 
state post-conviction proceedings.18 
Two years later, in Murray v. Giarratano, a plurality of the Court af-
firmed Finley and concluded, in relevant part, that the constitutional 
guarantee of meaningful access to the courts also does not require 
assistance of counsel during state post-conviction proceedings involv-
ing capital defendants.19  Specifically, in Murray, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, joined by Justices White, O’Connor, and Scalia, rejected the ar-
gument by Virginia death row inmates that assistance of counsel was 
necessary in order to ensure their constitutional right of access to the 
courts in state habeas proceedings, as guaranteed by Bounds v. Smith.20  
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor, concurred in the judg-
ment, but noted that “[t]he complexity of [Supreme Court] jurispru-
 
 14 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610–11 (1974) (concluding due process and equal protec-
tion interests underlying right to counsel on direct appeal do not extend to discretionary 
review by the state’s high court). 
 15 See generally Emily Garcia Uhrig, A Case for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Habeas Corpus, 
60 HASTINGS L.J. 541 (2009) (arguing for a right to counsel in habeas corpus for claims 
unique to habeas proceedings, for which the petitioner has not yet had assistance of 
counsel).  But cf. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 927 (2012) (holding attorney aban-
donment of client provides basis for “cause” to excuse procedural default caused there-
by); Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010) (finding extraordinary ineffective assis-
tance of counsel may justify equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations). 
 16 Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555–57, 559 (1987) (rejecting right to counsel in 
state post-conviction proceedings on both access-to-the-courts and due process, funda-
mental fairness grounds). 
 17 Id. at 557. 
 18 Id. 
 19 492 U.S. 1, 11–13 (1989). 
 20 Id. at 3–4, 12; Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (“[T]he fundamental constitu-
tional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the 
preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate 
law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.”). 
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dence in this area . . . makes it unlikely that capital defendants will be 
able to file successful petitions for collateral relief without the assis-
tance of persons learned in the law.”21  Nonetheless, he agreed peti-
tioners had failed to state a claim for relief because, to date, no capi-
tal petitioner in Virginia had been unable to obtain counsel to assist 
in habeas proceedings and state prisons had staff attorneys to assist 
inmates with preparing their petitions.22  Thus, Justice Kennedy was 
“not prepared to say that this scheme violates the Constitution.”23 
Seven years later, in Lewis v. Casey, the Court modified its holding 
in Bounds to make clear that the access right does not encompass as-
sistance with investigating claims and litigating them effectively.24  Ra-
ther, the right encompasses only assistance in getting through the 
courthouse doors, as opposed to a right to substantive assistance with 
one’s case once inside.25  The Court further held that to show an 
access violation, a petitioner must demonstrate actual injury, i.e., that 
the State’s failure to provide adequate assistance impeded the peti-
tioner in his efforts to pursue a legal claim in post-conviction pro-
ceedings.26 
The Court has not addressed whether a right to counsel attaches 
in federal habeas proceedings.  But federal courts since Finley, Giarra-
tano, and Lewis generally have assumed that both capital and non-
capital inmates do not have a constitutional right to counsel in feder-
al habeas corpus proceedings.27  This judicial mindset has remained 
intact despite the dramatic overhaul and inordinate complication of 
federal habeas practice wrought by AEDPA.28  The complexity of post-
AEDPA federal habeas practice calls for re-examination of the issue 
and recognition of a limited right to counsel to ensure the indigent 
state inmate’s constitutional right of access to the courts in federal 
habeas proceedings. 
 
 21 Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 14 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 22 Id. at 14–15. 
 23 Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
 24 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 351–60 (analyzing the “actual injury” requirement). 
 27 United States v. Pollard, 389 F.3d 101, 111 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Perez-Macias, 
335 F.3d 421, 428 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 28 Within the past year, the Supreme Court has twice recognized actual or potential relief 
from some of AEDPA’s strictures based on extreme failings of counsel.  See Maples v. 
Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012) (holding that attorney abandonment of client provides ba-
sis for “cause” to excuse procedural default caused thereby); Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 
2549 (2010) (finding extraordinary ineffective assistance of counsel may justify equitable 
tolling of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations). 
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B. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), which substantially narrowed the 
legal parameters of federal habeas review.29  Conservative advocates 
had been attempting to place limits on capital habeas corpus for dec-
ades.30  Critics identified habeas practice, rather than the many flaws 
and irregularities that often accompany capital convictions, as the 
source of unacceptable delay between conviction and execution.31  Ef-
forts at restricting the Great Writ eventually found traction with the 
domestic terrorist bombing of the Oklahoma City Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building, in which 168 people perished.32  The emotional af-
termath of the bombing, and a concomitant desire to see “swift and 
certain justice” imposed on the perpetrators, aligned with Republican 
majorities in Congress to provide the necessary catalyst for statutory 
change.33 
In relevant part,34 AEDPA revised 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2253–
2255, which govern all federal habeas corpus proceedings.35  AEDPA 
also created a new Chapter 154 of the Judicial Code for state capital 
cases that provides for rules favorable to the State if the State meets 
certain conditions, including providing assistance of counsel in state 
 
 29 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(1996). 
 30 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S4363 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1996) (statement of Sen. Spencer Ab-
raham) (“Reform of our habeas corpus system has been needed, and needed badly, for 
several decades now.”). 
 31 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H3603–04 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Henry 
Hyde) (“Somehow, somewhere we are going to end the charade of endless habeas pro-
ceedings, and this bill is going to do it.”); 142 CONG. REC. S3459 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) 
(statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“But just look at the highlights of this antiterrorism bill.  
Capital punishment reform, death penalty reform, something that has been needed for 
years, decades.  It is being abused all over the country.  There are better than 3000 people 
who have been living on death row for years with the sentences never carried out . . . .”). 
 32 Terror Hits Home:  Oklahoma City Bombing, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://
www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing (last visited April 22, 
2012). 
 33 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S4363 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1996) (statement of Sen. Spencer Ab-
raham) (“The Oklahoma City bombing finally provided the clarion call that made it poss-
ible for the Republican majority, with President Clinton’s reluctant acquiescence, and 
over stiff resistance by a majority of the Democrats, to enact reforms to this legal quag-
mire.”). 
 34 Title I of AEDPA revised the federal habeas statutes; the remaining titles are unrelated.  
See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326–27 n.1 (1997) (noting the other titles address vic-
tim restitution, international terrorism, weapons and explosives restrictions, and “miscel-
laneous items,” respectively). 
 35 See Lindh, 521 U.S. at 326–27. 
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post-conviction proceedings.36  The Congressional Conference Com-
mittee report summarized AEDPA’s purpose in revising federal ha-
beas practice as follows:  “This title incorporates reforms to curb the 
abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus, and to address the acute 
problems of unnecessary delay and abuse in capital cases.”37  Similar-
ly, President Clinton’s signing statement to AEDPA declared the sta-
tute’s intent as being to “streamline [f]ederal appeals for convicted 
criminals sentenced to the death penalty,” though not to alter subs-
tantively the standards for issuance of the writ.38 
Despite its stated target of capital cases, AEDPA, as enacted, fun-
damentally changed longstanding provisions governing all federal 
habeas corpus practice involving challenges to the legality of criminal 
convictions.39  Most significantly, the statute introduced a one-year 
statute of limitations to filing any federal habeas petition, introduced 
a ban on filing second or successive petitions, and limited the scope 
of substantive review.  At the same time, AEDPA left intact the pre-
existing doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default.  Federal 
courts have devoted substantial energy since 1996 attempting to un-
derstand the intricate mechanics of the statute of limitations as ap-
plied, as well as its interplay with the remaining procedural doctrines.  
The resulting body of law is inordinately complex and vexing to even 
the most experienced of jurists. 
This Article does not attempt a thorough exposition of these pro-
cedural doctrines.40  Rather, what follows is merely a general overview 
of the doctrines that function, at times in concert, to block access to 
the courts for the pro se habeas litigant. 
 
 36 Id. at 327 (citing Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, ch. 154, 110 Stat. 1221–1226 (1996), amended by the USA PATRIOT Improvement 
and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006)).  To date, no 
state has been able to satisfy these heightened requirements.  See 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES 
S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3.3[a] (6th ed. 2011) 
[hereinafter 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN] (addressing the fact that, as of yet, no state has been 
able to meet the opt-in requirements).  Hence, this Article does not address the implica-
tions of those provisions. 
 37 H.R. REP. NO. 104–518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); see also 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra 
note 36, at § 3.2 (quoting the Conference Committee Report). 
 38 Presidential Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 719, 720 (Apr. 24, 1996). 
 39 See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005) (“The enactment of AEDPA in 1996 dra-
matically altered the landscape for federal habeas petitions.”). 
 40 For the authoritative treatise on the nuances, intricacies, and history of federal habeas 
corpus, see 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 36; 2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (6th ed. 2011) [hereinafter 2 HERTZ 
& LIEBMAN]. 
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C. Expecting the Impossible:  The Introduction of a One-Year Statute of 
Limitations 
Until 1996, there was no fixed time limit for filing a federal ha-
beas petition challenging a state conviction.  The only constraint was 
a flexible rule of “prejudicial delay,” which resembled in effect the 
equitable doctrine of laches.41  AEDPA introduced a one-year statute 
of limitations for filing § 2254 petitions challenging a state criminal 
judgment42 and § 2255 motions attacking a federal criminal judg-
ment.43  To understand the dramatic impact of AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations requires an examination of its complex mechanics. 
Under §§ 2244(d) and 2255, the one-year statute of limitations 
does not start to run until the challenged state or federal judgment 
becomes final, any state or government-created impediments to filing 
are removed, the constitutional right asserted is first recognized by 
the United States Supreme Court if made retroactively applicable to 
collateral review, or the factual or legal bases for a claim become 
 
 41 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 36, at § 5.2. 
 42 Under AEDPA, for state inmates who seek federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 
§ 2244(d) of that title now provides: 
(1) A one-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of ha-
beas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a [s]tate court.  
The limitation period shall run from the latest of— 
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct re-
view or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 
(B)  the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by [s]tate 
action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if 
the applicant was prevented from filing by such [s]tate action; 
(C)  the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by 
the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court 
and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 
(D)  the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented 
could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 
(2)  The time during which a properly filed application for [s]tate post-
conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or 
claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this 
subsection. 
 43 For federal inmates seeking habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006), the revised sta-
tute provides: 
A one-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section.  The li-
mitation period shall run from the latest of— 
(1)   the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; 
(2)   the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by govern-
mental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is re-
moved, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental 
action; 
(3)   the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme 
Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made re-
troactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 
(4)   the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could 
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 
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available.44  For state inmates, the time during which state post-
conviction proceedings pertinent to the judgment the inmate seeks 
to challenge in federal court are pending tolls the one-year statute of 
limitations.  In light of these myriad triggering and tolling dates, cal-
culation of the statute of limitations, particularly under § 2244(d) for 
state inmates, has proven extremely challenging.  Indeed, at virtually 
every analytical juncture, difficult issues have emerged.  Successfully 
navigating these hurdles requires both legal skill and, where judicial 
precedent is lacking, the ability to anticipate accurately AEDPA’s con-
tours.  Absent the fortuity of an available and competent “jailhouse 
lawyer”—i.e., a fellow inmate self-educated in the legal process who 
assists other inmates in litigating claims and cases45—pro se state in-
mate litigants who seek federal habeas relief are stymied first by the 
lack of sufficient legal skills to calculate the filing requirements.  
Second, even where some assistance is provided, legal missteps are 
not uncommon by even highly competent counsel.  But absent a 
right to counsel in the first instance, the petitioner is left without a 
remedy to correct any mistake, including those that function to slam 
the courthouse door shut on substantive merits review of federal ha-
beas claims. 
1. The Challenge of Figuring Out Even Where to Begin:  Calculating the 
Elusive Triggering Date for the Statute of Limitations 
The statute of limitations does not start to run until the judgment 
an inmate seeks to challenge “becom[es] final.”46  But what does this 
mean?  That is, how does an inmate translate these two words into 
practice in his own case?  As with many of the most difficult issues 
posed under AEDPA, the statute itself is silent on the issue.47 
As an initial matter, the inmate must determine whether to look 
to state or federal law in assessing finality.  Federal appellate courts 
disagree to some extent as to the role of state law in defining “finali-
ty” under § 2244(d)(1)(A).48  Thus, the burden will be on the peti-
 
 44 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(B)–(D), 2255 (2006). 
 45 See Evan R. Seamone, Fahrenheit 451 on Cell Block D:  A Bar Examination to Safeguard Ameri-
ca’s Jailhouse Lawyers from the Post-Lewis Blaze Consuming Their Law Libraries, 24 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 91, 93–94 (2006) (describing in relevant part the characteristics and role of 
the “jailhouse lawyer”). 
 46 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
 47 The Supreme Court has noted finality under § 2244(d) “is a concept that has been ‘va-
riously defined . . . [and] like many legal terms, its precise meaning depends on con-
text.’”  Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119 (2009). 
 48 Compare Roberts v. Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 693–95 (5th Cir. 2003) (refusing to consider 
state law that set date of finality of judgment with the Court of Appeals’ issuance of 
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tioner to determine whether his jurisdiction honors state law in as-
sessing finality.  As with all of AEDPA’s statute of limitations intrica-
cies, an error in calculation can doom a federal petition to dismissal 
as untimely. 
But federal courts have generally agreed on several triggering 
principles.  First, when the petitioner pursues all available direct ap-
peals within the state or federal system, including discretionary ap-
peals, the triggering event is either the completion of certiorari pro-
ceedings in the United States Supreme Court or the expiration of 
time within which to file a petition for writ of certiorari.49  Second, if 
no direct appeal is filed, the conviction becomes final at the expira-
tion of the time for filing such appeal.50  The same rule obtains where 
a petitioner files an untimely notice of appeal.51  Thus, if state law 
permits a defendant thirty days to file a notice of appeal of a convic-
tion by trial or guilty plea, but instead he or she waits a year to do so, 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations will start to run after thirty days.  As a 
result, only one month will remain to file a federal habeas petition by 
the time the state notice of appeal is filed.  Similarly, where a peti-
tioner files a first direct appeal to the state intermediate appellate 
court but does not pursue a further direct appeal to a higher state 
court, the triggering event becomes the date of expiration for filing 
the appeal to the higher appellate court.52  The result is that AEDPA’s 
trigger date, i.e., when the sand begins to slip through the proverbial 
hour glass for federal habeas review, is a moving target, dependent 
on what relief a petitioner seeks, or fails to seek, on direct review.  Yet 
the calculation is critical for it is obvious that only in knowing when 
 
mandate), and Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897–98, 898 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(finding conviction became “final” under § 2244(d)(1)(A) when state appellate court 
denied motion to modify ruling, despite state courts’ use of date of issuance of mandate 
as point of finality of judgment), with Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 
2001) (finding judgment becomes final on date of issuance of mandate, as provided by 
Florida state law). 
 49 E.g., Jimenez, 555 U.S. at 119; Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 524–25, 527 (2003); Ro-
binson v. United States, 416 F.3d 645, 647 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1176 
(2006); Nix v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 393 F.3d 1235, 1236–37 (11th Cir. 2004) (per cu-
riam), cert. denied sub nom. Crosby v. Nix, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005); see also 1 HERTZ & 
LIEBMAN, supra note 36, at § 5.2[b][i] n.45. 
 50 E.g., United States v. Plascencia, 537 F.3d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 2008); Moshier v. United 
States, 402 F.3d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 
565, 575 (3d Cir. 1999); see also 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 36, at § 5.2[b][i] n.48. 
 51 E.g., Randle v. Crawford, 578 F.3d 1177, 1183–84 (9th Cir. 2009); Bethea v. Girdich, 293 
F.3d 577, 578 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 52 E.g., Roberts, 319 F.3d at 693–95; Wixom, 264 F.3d at 898; Gendron v. United States, 154 
F.3d 672, 674 nn.1–2 (7th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Ahitow v. Glass, 
526 U.S. 1113 (1999); see also 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 36, at § 5.2[b][i] n.49. 
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the one-year statute of limitations starts to run can a petitioner have a 
chance at determining when it ends. 
2. Impediments to Filing:  Once the Clock Has Started to Tick, What, if 
Anything, Will Cause it to Stop? 
Regardless of when a conviction becomes final, thus triggering the 
start of the one-year period of time to file a federal petition, the sta-
tute of limitations will not run under § 2244(d) during any period in 
which a state or government-created “impediment” prevents the peti-
tioner from filing the petition or motion.53  Such impediments can 
exist prior to the conviction becoming final, thus forestalling the start 
of the statute of limitations.  Or an impediment can arise once the 
statute of limitations has already started to run, thus stopping the 
clock until such time as the State clears the path to filing by removing 
the impediment.  But once again, AEDPA does not delineate what 
constitutes a state or government-created impediment.54  To make 
matters even more difficult, circuit case law grappling with the doc-
trine is relatively sparse. 
At minimum, courts appear to exempt the role of the judiciary 
from “state action,” instead requiring the actor to be an arm of either 
the prosecutor or the penological institution charged with the peti-
tioner’s detention.55  Thus, a change in state law that provides a new 
basis for relief will not qualify as an impediment because, notwith-
standing the prior adverse precedent, the petitioner was still free to 
raise such a claim in a federal petition “at any time.”56  In other words, 
a pro se petitioner is expected to anticipate future changes in the law 
that will inure to his favor and seek habeas relief on a ground for 
which no legal support exists.57 
 
 53 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(B), 2255 (2006); see also Bryant v. Schriro, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 
(9th Cir. 2007) (“To obtain relief under § 2244(d)(1)(B), the petitioner must show a 
causal connection between the unlawful impediment and his failure to file a timely ha-
beas petition.” (internal citation omitted)); Broom v. Strickland, 579 F.3d 553, 556–57 
(6th Cir. 2009) (rejecting relief based on impediment for lack of causation). 
 54 See Wood v. Spencer, 487 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that “the word ‘impediment’ is 
not defined in the statute itself, nor is it self-elucidating”). 
 55 Compare Minter v. Beck, 230 F.3d 663, 665–66 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that negative case 
law rendering futile raising of claim in state court did not constitute state-created “impe-
diment” under § 2244(d)(1)(B)), with Critchley v. Thaler, 586 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 
2009) (finding that failure of county clerk’s office to timely file petition for post-
conviction relief constitutes “impediment” under § 2244(d)(1)(B)). 
 56 Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., Minter, 230 F.3d at 
665–66. 
 57 Unless the Supreme Court makes a change to the substantive law underlying a constitu-
tional claim retroactive, even if the prior state of the law were deemed an “impediment,” 
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To date, some circuits have recognized as a possible impediment 
the State’s failure to make available to inmates legal material pertain-
ing to AEDPA, i.e., a copy of the statute itself, where the absence of 
that material prevented the petitioner from learning of the one-year 
statute of limitations.58  On the other hand, even in a capital case, er-
rors attributed to post-conviction counsel, as opposed to a state or 
government actor, do not constitute “impediments” under 
§ 2244(d)(1)(B).59  In addition, the First Circuit has rejected an ar-
gument that the State’s withholding of exculpatory evidence in viola-
tion of Brady v. Maryland60 constitutes an impediment on the ground 
that the petitioner could have obtained the same evidence elsewhere 
prior to trial in the exercise of due diligence.61 
In light of the underdeveloped state of the law on the definition 
of “impediment,” the lack of assistance of counsel may have a pro-
found effect.  That is, by exploring the many interstices of this proce-
dural doctrine, a skilled advocate may succeed in securing a broader 
definition from a particular court.  In contrast, for the pro se litigant, 
the doctrine will likely lie fallow and useless in his efforts to obtain 
federal review of otherwise untimely filed habeas claims. 
 
the inmate would be denied relief on the merits.  See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) 
(with two exceptions, prohibiting use of federal habeas (1) to enforce “new rule” of law 
where rule was announced after the petitioner’s conviction became “final”; or (2) to es-
tablish a new rule or apply precedent in a novel manner that would create a “new rule); 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (limiting in relevant part relief on the merits to claims 
where the decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by [the U.S. Supreme Court]). 
 58 E.g., Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also 
Moore v. Battaglia, 476 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 2007) (remanding for development of factual 
record regarding claim that inadequate prison law library constituted a state-created im-
pediment).  But cf. Finch v. Miller, 491 F.3d 424 (8th Cir. 2007) (rejecting on causation 
ground argument that inadequate library facilities or legal assistance qualified as impe-
diment). 
 59 Compare Johnson v. Fla. Dep’t. of Corr., 513 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008) (basing con-
clusion on the lack of a constitutional right to post-conviction counsel), with Finch, 491 
F.3d 424 (basing same conclusion on ground that counsel’s conduct does not constitute 
“state action” under § 2244(d)(1)(B)) and Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (stating that incompetent assistance of counsel in capital post-conviction pro-
ceedings “is not the type of [s]tate impediment envisioned in § 2244(d)(1)(B)”). 
 60 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 61 Wood v. Spencer, 487 F.3d 1, 6–8 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting “petitioner had the power to 
blunt the effect of any state-created impediment”). 
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3. Necessary Efforts at Identifying Other Statute of Limitations Triggers 
a. Newly Recognized Constitutional Right 
AEDPA’s one-year period of time to file a federal petition is also 
triggered anew under § 2244(d) when the Supreme Court recognizes 
a new constitutional right that is made expressly retroactive to cases 
on collateral review.62  It is an open question whether the Supreme 
Court itself must determine retroactivity, or whether lower federal 
courts are also authorized under AEDPA to do so.63  Every circuit to 
consider the issue has concluded that lower federal courts, as well as 
the Supreme Court, can make the retroactivity assessment.64  Again, 
the fact that lower courts, at least for now, can determine whether a 
newly recognized right should apply retroactively leaves ample room 
for effective advocacy on the part of the petitioner.  Thus, the unre-
presented petitioner is at a distinct disadvantage in convincing a 
court of relief from AEDPA’s timeliness bar based on a newly recog-
nized constitutional right. 
b. Discovery of Factual Predicate 
The statute of limitations is also triggered under § 2244(d), re-
gardless of the above events, on the date on which the petitioner 
could have discovered the factual predicate for the claim or claims 
raised in the petition in the exercise of due diligence.65  The language 
of § 2244(d)(1)(D) is ambiguous as to whether the statute of limita-
tions applies to the petition or to independent claims.66  Federal 
courts appear to endorse the former interpretation, though will per-
mit amendment of a pending petition to add a claim derived from 
newly discovered facts that the inmate was unable to uncover through 
due diligence at the time of filing.67  But the petitioner must make the 
case for why he failed to discover the claim or claims earlier.  Without 
more, his pro se status, which encompasses the fact that he is incarce-
 
 62 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) (2006). 
 63 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 36, at § 5.2[b][i] n.55. 
 64 See, e.g., Dodd v. United States, 365 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 
545 U.S. 353 (2005) (“every circuit to consider this issue has held that a court other than 
the Supreme Court may make the retroactivity decision for purposes of § 2255(3)”); Ash-
ley v. United States, 266 F.3d 671, 673–75 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding lower federal courts 
can make retroactivity determination); United States v. Lopez, 248 F.3d 427, 432–33 (5th 
Cir. 2001) (same). 
 65 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) (2006). 
 66 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 36, at § 5.2[b][i] n.64. 
 67 Id. at § 5.2[b], 5.2[b][i] nn.52–55 (internal citations omitted). 
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rated without outside legal and investigative assistance to uncover 
facts that might support a claim for habeas relief, will not suffice.68  
Once again, federal courts engage in mythical thinking in assuming 
that the average incarcerated inmate is as able to litigate and conduct 
factual investigations as the professional attorney. 
4. Unpacking the Doctrine of Statutory Tolling 
Calculating the start date for the statute of limitations is only the 
beginning of the pro se inmate’s daunting procedural challenge of 
ensuring his federal petition is timely filed.  The second major hurdle 
in determining the actual filing deadline is accurately calculating the 
effects of AEDPA’s doctrine of statutory tolling.  As a nod to the prin-
ciples of federalism that permeate federal habeas corpus and the ac-
companying requirement that inmates exhaust all federal claims in 
state court,69 AEDPA provides that, regardless of the date on which 
the statute of limitations starts to run, for inmates challenging state 
convictions under § 2254, the clock will stop—i.e., AEDPA’s one-year 
filing period is tolled—while “a properly filed application for state 
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the perti-
nent judgment or claim is pending . . . .”70  But again, the statutory 
language of § 2244(d)(2) raises at least as many questions as it an-
swers.  For example, what does “properly filed” mean?  Does “or oth-
er collateral review” include federal habeas petitions?  How should 
federal courts interpret “with respect to the pertinent judgment or 
claim”?  What does it mean to be “pending”?  The federal judiciary 
has devoted substantial energy since AEDPA’s enactment to each of 
these issues.  As a result, some rules are now clear through case law; 
others remain uncertain.  The pro se inmate must discern these 
nuances and distinctions, with consequences potentially fatal to fed-
eral habeas review. 
 
 68 Rich v. Dep’t of Corr., 317 F. App’x 881, 883 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that pro se status 
is not an extraordinary circumstance that entitled petitioner to tolling of the one-year 
time limit); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that pro se 
petitioner’s inability to calculate the limitations period correctly is not an extraordinary 
circumstance and not allowing amendment to relate back to the date the original petition 
was filed); United States v. Hale, Crim. No. 07-0385-WS-C, Civ. No. 09-0494-WS, 2010 WL 
2105141, at *11 (S.D. Ala. 2010) (holding that pro se status was not extraordinary cir-
cumstance to allow petition to be amended after the filing deadline had passed). 
 69 See exhaustion discussion, infra Part I.D.1. 
 70 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2006). 
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a. The Meaning of “Properly Filed” 
For purposes of § 2244(d)(2), “an application is ‘properly filed’ 
when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applica-
ble laws and rules governing filings,” including, “for example, the 
form of the document, the time limits upon its delivery, the court and 
office in which it must be lodged, and the requisite filing fee.”71  
Thus, the Supreme Court has concluded, at least insofar as state law 
on timeliness is firmly established and consistently applied,72 an un-
timely state petition is not “properly filed.”73  Mundane as these as-
sessments may be, the unrepresented habeas petitioner again con-
fronts the task of identifying, understanding, and complying with 
state law governing collateral review in order to qualify for AEDPA’s 
statutory tolling.  Absent assistance from a competent jailhouse lawyer 
or law librarian, the process can stall here, with the inmate unable to 
figure out how to “properly file” a state petition, a step that in turn is 
essential to exhaust claims a petitioner seeks to raise in a federal peti-
tion. 
b. Figuring Out What Qualifies for Statutory Tolling:  The 
Scope of “Or Other Collateral Review” 
In 2001, the Supreme Court held that “application for [s]tate 
post-conviction or other collateral review” does not contemplate fed-
eral habeas petitions.74  Rather, the Court held, the phrase refers only 
to state applications and includes all state procedures available for re-
view of a criminal conviction.75  Thus, no tolling applies—i.e., the sta-
 
 71 Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (internal citations omitted). 
 72 See 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 36, at § 5.2[b][i][i] n.68 (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 
544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005)) (noting that Pace’s holding “glossed over some complicating 
factors that were not present in Pace” and that may require additional analysis on the part 
of a reviewing federal habeas corpus court:  situations in which (1) “the statute of limita-
tions at issue is not a jurisdictional time bar, as was the time limit in Pace, but rather func-
tions as an affirmative defense that can be waived” and (2) “there was no clear ‘state law’ 
on timeliness at the relevant stage of the proceedings because the timing rule to which 
the state points—and upon which a state court ultimately relied in deeming a state post-
conviction petition to have been untimely—had not yet been announced or was not firm-
ly established and consistently followed at the time the prisoner filed the state post-
conviction petition”); see also Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1128–29 (2011) (finding 
California’s timeliness bar independent and consistently applied). 
 73 Pace, 544 U.S. at 412. 
 74 Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181 (2001). 
 75 Id. at 176. 
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tute of limitations continues to run—during the time in which a fed-
eral habeas petition is pending.76 
While the Court’s interpretation of § 2244(d)(2) makes sense as 
an intellectual matter, due to the length of time federal courts take to 
resolve federal petitions, the lack of tolling for federal petitions has 
generated enormous headaches for pro se inmates attempting to 
comply with the one-year statute of limitations.77  Even where a pro se 
inmate manages to negotiate the myriad landmines of AEDPA’s sta-
tute of limitations and timely file his § 2254 petition, it is the rare case 
in which the one-year period will not have expired by the time the 
federal court has ruled on the petition.  Thus, a petition dismissed 
without prejudice to refiling for procedural reasons such as lack of 
exhaustion may be forever barred on the merits simply because the 
statute of limitations expired while the petition was pending before 
the federal court.78  This reality hits pro se litigants particularly hard 
for two reasons.  First, it is axiomatic that such petitioners are more 
likely to commit procedural missteps and hence, confront this scena-
rio than those represented by counsel.  Second, where a petition is at 
least partially unexhausted, i.e., the inmate has not yet presented 
each claim raised therein to the highest available state court of re-
view, a district court will give the inmate the choice between dismiss-
ing the entire petition “without prejudice” or staying the exhausted 
portion of the petition and holding it in abeyance while the inmate 
returns to state court to finish exhausting.79  The court is not required, 
however, to advise the inmate that if he opts to dismiss the petition in 
its entirety, the “without prejudice” language is illusory in that any 
 
 76 Id. at 181. 
 77 See NANCY J. KING ET AL., Final Technical Report:  Habeas Litigation in U.S. District 
Courts:  An Empirical Study of Habeas Corpus Cases Filed by State Prisoners Under the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, at 42 (2007), available at http:// 
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf [hereinafter Habeas Litigation Technical 
Report] (noting that, as of 2006, federal habeas cases filed in 2002 and 2003 had been 
pending for an average of 5.3 years for capital cases); Arthur L. Alarcón, Remedies for Cali-
fornia’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 697, 699, 709 (2007) (noting that, in 1989, 
the average delay for a federal habeas corpus case was eight years; as of 2006, a California 
inmate who filed a habeas appeal and had his sentence vacated by a federal court waited 
an average of 16.75 years); Limin Zheng, Comment, Actual Innocence as a Gateway Through 
the Statute-of-Limitations Bar on the Filing of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 
2101, 2131 (2002) (noting that in 1979 the average time from date of conviction to the 
filing of a federal habeas petition was a year and a half; by 1995, the average time had in-
creased to over five years). 
 78 The harshness of this consequence has spawned the “relation back” doctrine and, in 
some cases, has provided a basis for equitable tolling.  These doctrines will be addressed, 
infra Parts I.C.5 and I.D.I. 
 79 E.g., Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). 
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subsequent petition in fact will be time-barred.80  Hence, a pro se pe-
titioner, well-intentioned but unschooled in AEDPA’s intricacies, is 
more likely to opt for dismissal.  He will do so with the misguided in-
tention of refiling after exhausting the claims at issue without realiz-
ing that the statute of limitations has already expired and thus, any 
future petition will be time-barred.  
c. Interpreting “With Respect to the Pertinent Judgment or 
Claim” 
State attorneys have argued that § 2244(d)(2) should not apply if 
the “[s]tate post-conviction or other collateral review” application did 
not raise any federally cognizable claims or did not involve at least 
one claim later raised in the § 2254 petition.81  Under this argument, 
if a petitioner files a state petition only raising state claims or federal-
ly cognizable claims that he later abandons before filing for federal 
habeas relief, no tolling under § 2244(d)(2) would apply.  Given the 
likelihood that, untolled, AEDPA’s statute of limitations would expire 
while such state application is pending, such an interpretation would 
likely be a death warrant for any future federal habeas review.  To 
avoid this consequence, a petitioner would have to anticipate and 
contemplate the contours of federal habeas review even before filing 
for any state collateral review.  Not only might this limit the utility of 
the state collateral review process,82 but again, the pro se litigant, less 
able to identify all potential claims, state and federal, from the be-
ginning and thus, more prone to piecemeal litigation, may find him-
self time-barred from federal review. 
Thus far, every circuit court to address this issue has rejected the 
state attorneys’ argument for such a strict interpretation of “pertinent 
judgment or claim.”83  Rather, the federal appeals courts have held 
 
 80 Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 (2004) (holding that federal district judges are not obligated 
to warn petitioner that subsequently raised federal claims would be time-barred); Bram-
bles v. Duncan, 412 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a court is not obligated to in-
form petitioner of what he must do to invoke stay and abey procedure or that federal 
claims would be time-barred when he returns to federal court). 
 81 Cowherd v. Million, 380 F.3d 909, 912 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc); e.g., Ford v. Moore, 296 
F.3d 1035, 1040 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 520 (3d 
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1002 (2003); Carter v. Litscher, 275 F.3d 663, 665 (7th 
Cir. 2001). 
 82 Arguably, a state petition for collateral review filed merely as a formality for exhaustion 
purposes will not explore the parameters of relief under state law as fully as one focused 
primarily on the state process. 
 83 See Cowherd, 380 F.3d at 913 (emphasis omitted) (overruling prior circuit precedent, 
which had held that state post-conviction proceedings toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations 
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that tolling applies regardless of the particular claims raised in the 
state post-conviction petition as long as the state and federal petition 
attack the same criminal judgment.84  But the Supreme Court has not 
yet addressed the issue.  Hence, the pro se litigant remains vulnerable 
to a future Supreme Court ruling to the contrary. 
d. Figuring Out the Meaning of “Pending” 
Lastly, federal courts have grappled with the meaning of “pend-
ing” as used in § 2244(d)(2).  What does it mean for a petition to be 
pending in state court?  Does this mean that in order to stop 
AEDPA’s clock, a state petition must literally be pending before a 
state court?  Or does the word also contemplate the necessary time 
gaps between filings in lower and appellate state courts?  Again, 
AEDPA, itself is silent on the issue. 
In 2002, in Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court concluded as a 
threshold matter that “the statutory word ‘pending’ . . . cover[s] the 
time between a lower state court’s decision and the filing of a [time-
ly] notice of appeal to a higher state court.”85  Thus, statutory tolling 
applies during the intervals between a lower court’s denial of a state 
petition and the filing of a timely appeal.  But Saffold is a California 
case, which complicates matters because that state uses a unique sys-
tem of collateral review in which each court—trial, appellate, and su-
preme—has original jurisdiction to consider an inmate’s post-
conviction petition.86  Although in practice, most petitioners ascend 
the courts as in other states, state law does not require that they do 
so.  And each petition an inmate files challenging a conviction is con-
 
only if they include a federal claim); see, e.g., Ford, 296 F.3d at 1040 (concluding that 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations is tolled by a properly filed state post-conviction petition 
attacking the same judgment challenged in the § 2254 petition regardless of whether the 
state petition raises any federally cognizable claims); Sweger, 294 F.3d at 513–520 (holding 
that AEDPA’s statute of limitations is tolled during pendency of state post-conviction pro-
ceedings that challenge the same judgment as does the § 2254 petition, regardless of 
overlap of claims raised in the respective petitions); Carter, 275 F.3d at 665 (holding that 
“properly filed collateral challenge to the judgment tolls the time to seek federal collater-
al review,” regardless of overlap in claims between state and federal petitions). 
 84 See supra note 81. 
 85 536 U.S. 214, 217 (2002). 
 86 See id. at 221–23 (describing California’s collateral review system); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 
F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging difficulty in applying tolling provisions to 
the California habeas process because each of the three levels of state courts has original 
jurisdiction in habeas proceedings); Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(noting that a habeas petitioner is entitled to “one full round of collateral review” in the 
state courts before the federal statute of limitations begins to run (internal citations omit-
ted)). 
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sidered “original,” rather than an appeal of a lower court’s denial.87  
Thus, it was unclear whether a petitioner was entitled to tolling under 
§ 2244(d)(2) for the intervals that elapse between a state court’s 
denial of one petition and the filing of a subsequent one in a higher 
state court.88  The Court in Saffold concluded, albeit somewhat opa-
quely, that interval tolling does apply at least insofar as the petitioner 
timely files his subsequent petition.89  But in so ruling, the Court ac-
knowledged that “[t]he fact that California’s timeliness standard is 
general rather than precise may make it more difficult for federal 
courts to determine just when a review application (i.e., a filing in a 
higher court) comes too late.”90  Indeed, the Court remanded the 
case, in part, for the Ninth Circuit to consider whether a four-and-a-
half-month gap between petitions filed in the California Court of Ap-
peal and California Supreme Court rendered the latter untimely.91 
Four years later, in Evans v. Chavis, the Supreme Court again at-
tempted to clarify the tolling doctrine as applied in California.92  In 
Evans, approximately three years had elapsed between the Court of 
Appeal’s denial of a petition and the petitioner’s filing in the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court.93  The state supreme court denied the latter 
petition without comment in a summary order.94  In concluding that 
the collateral review application was “pending” during the three-year 
period and thus, that the petitioner was entitled to tolling under 
§ 2244(d)(2), the Ninth Circuit treated the denial “without comment 
or citation” as a “decision on the merits,” rather than a dismissal as 
untimely.95 
On review, the Supreme Court summarized its decision in Saffold 
as holding:   
(1) only a timely appeal tolls AEDPA’s [one]-year limitations period for 
the time between the lower court’s adverse decision and the filing of a 
notice of appeal in the higher court;  
(2) in California, ‘unreasonable’ delays are not timely; and  
 
 87 Each state court determines the timeliness of a petition based on an indeterminate “rea-
sonableness” standard, rather than a notice of appeal.  See Saffold, 536 U.S. at 221 (noting 
differences between California’s collateral review system and that of typical “appeal” 
states). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 222–23. 
 90 Id. at 223. 
 91 Id. at 226–27. 
 92 546 U.S. 189 (2006). 
 93 Id. at 195–96. 
 94 Id. at 195. 
 95 Chavis v. LeMarque, 382 F.3d 921, 926 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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(3) (most pertinently) a California Supreme Court order denying a peti-
tion ‘on the merits’ does not automatically indicate that the petition was 
timely filed.96   
The Court observed that, for at least six months of the time 
elapsed between petitions, petitioner had access to the prison law li-
brary to work on his petition.97  Additionally, the Court “found no au-
thority suggesting, nor found any convincing reason to believe, that 
California would consider an unjustified or unexplained [six]-month 
filing delay ‘reasonable.’”98  The Court therefore concluded the peti-
tion was not “pending” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2) during 
the interval between denial of the Court of Appeal’s petition and pe-
titioner’s filing in the state supreme court.99  Thus, the Court reversed 
and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings.  
In so doing, as in Saffold, the Court did not define “reasonableness” 
with any precision, but instead deferred to state law and a petitioner’s 
particular circumstances to inform that determination.100 
For the California litigant, the legal contours of statutory tolling 
after Saffold and Evans are far from clear.  In both cases, the Supreme 
Court demurred on telling the lower courts—and hence, habeas peti-
tioners—what exactly constitutes a reasonable interval between state 
petitions to qualify for interval tolling under § 2244(d)(2).  Thus, pe-
titioners must make their best guess at how much is too much time to 
take in preparing a subsequent petition.  Where that guess is wrong, 
such as in Saffold and Evans, the petitioner will be time-barred from 
federal habeas review under AEDPA.  As with the other intricacies of 
procedural calculations under AEDPA, the pro se litigant is particu-
larly vulnerable to this consequence as a result of simple miscalcula-
tion or simply requiring more time than deemed “reasonable” to in-
vestigate, research, and present habeas claims from behind bars.  
Indeed, it is profoundly unfair to expect accuracy in calculation from 
a pro se inmate on a topic that neither the Supreme Court nor the 
Ninth Circuit has succeeded at clarifying. 
There exists an additional aspect of statutory tolling calculation 
that may prove particularly challenging to a pro se litigant in Califor-
nia:  lower federal courts have applied statutory tolling to any second 
or successive state post-conviction petition that is “properly filed” pur-
 
 96 Chavis, 546 U.S. at 197. 
 97 Id. at 201. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
100 Id. 
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suant to state procedural law.101  But tolling is unavailable for the in-
tervals between successive rounds of state habeas petitions.102 
Again, California is the problem child, as federal courts have 
struggled to identify the point at which one “round” of post-
conviction petitions ends and the next begins.103  For example, be-
cause each court has original jurisdiction, a California petitioner can 
file three consecutive petitions in superior court, two petitions in the 
court of appeal, and a third in the state supreme court, and not nec-
essarily in ascending order.104  Or a petitioner can skip over the lower 
courts altogether and file directly in the state supreme court.105  How 
then to define the parameters of “one round” of habeas petitions?  
The Ninth Circuit has attempted to do so by assessing the claims 
raised in each individual petition to determine similarity or distinc-
tiveness.106  But petitions involving overlapping claims—some repeat 
and some new—defy easy categorization.107  If a pro se litigant wrong-
ly assumes he is pursuing a continuous “round” of habeas petitions 
and calculates his one-year period under AEDPA accordingly, he may 
be ineligible for continuous tolling under § 2244(d)(2) and hence, 
face dismissal of his § 2254 petition as time-barred. 
5. Mining the Indeterminate Doctrine of Equitable Tolling 
Yet another source of perplexity in calculating the time to file a 
federal petition under AEDPA is the doctrine of equitable tolling.  
This doctrine is a creature of common law, rather than the statute it-
self, with federal courts importing it from other statutory contexts.  
 
101 See, e.g., Drew v. Dep’t. of Corr., 297 F.3d 1278, 1284–85 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub 
nom. Drew v. Crosby, 537 U.S. 1237 (2003); Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d 1153, 1155 (10th 
Cir. 1999); Lovasz v. Vaugn, 134 F.3d 146, 148–49 (3d Cir. 1998). 
102 See, e.g., Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2010). 
103 See, e.g., Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1040–45 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing the difficul-
ty of determining whether an application for California habeas relief is “pending” within 
the meaning of §2244(d)(2)). 
104 CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10; e.g., Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1125 (2011) (noting that 
where the superior court denies a petition, the petitioner can obtain review of the claims 
raised therein only by filing a new petition in the court of appeal, confined to claims 
raised in the initial petition). 
105 Walker, 131 S. Ct. at 1125. 
106 Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1044–46 (9th Cir. 2005) (comparing claims in multiple 
applications and granting tolling because some claims overlapped). 
107 Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079, 1081–84. (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a petitioner is not 
entitled to tolling when he abandons all initial claims from a first application in a subse-
quent application); In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 770 (Cal. 1993) (“A successive petition pre-
senting additional claims that could have been presented in an earlier attack on the 
judgment is, of necessity, a delayed petition,” requiring a “persuasive reason for routinely 
permitting consideration of the merits of such claims.”). 
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Founded on principles of equity—that is, what is “fair” under particu-
lar circumstances—the doctrine is necessarily flexible and resists 
ready categorization.108  Instead, courts inquire whether extraordinary 
circumstances, apart from the inmate’s lack of due diligence, pre-
vented him from filing his petition on time.109  Courts define “due di-
ligence,” in turn, as “reasonable diligence,” rather than “maximum 
feasible diligence.”110 
Until very recently, a majority of the Supreme Court had not em-
braced the doctrine in the context of AEDPA.111  In Holland v. Florida, 
however, decided in June 2010, the Court agreed with every circuit to 
address the issue that the doctrine is in fact a viable one under 
AEDPA.112  To qualify for equitable tolling, a petitioner must identify 
an “extraordinary” circumstance that prevented his timely filing and 
show that he exercised reasonable diligence despite that circums-
tance.113  Both tasks require legal and analytical skills on the part of 
the advocate. 
Courts have endorsed equitable tolling where delay that prevents 
timely filing results from judicial action or omission;114 certain actions 
or omissions of petitioner’s counsel;115 the prisoner’s mental incom-
petence;116 and failure to provide petitioner notice of AEDPA’s filing 
 
108 Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2563 (2010). 
109 Id. at 2553 (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). 
110 Id. at 2565 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
111 Id. at 2560. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 2553. 
114 Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 234 (2004) (remanding to Ninth Circuit on the issue of 
whether magistrate judge “affirmatively misled” petitioner, resulting in subsequent filing 
of time-barred petition, thus warranting equitable tolling); Keenan v. Bagley, 400 F.3d 
417, 421–22 (6th Cir. 2005) (remanding for evidentiary hearing on whether Ohio Su-
preme Court’s order extending state statute of limitations justified equitable tolling of 
federal statute of limitations); Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 710–11 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(per curiam) (holding that petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling where state su-
preme court sent notice of decision to the wrong person, thus denying petitioner timely 
notice). 
115 Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1313 (11th Cir. 2008) (remanding for evidentiary hear-
ing to decide whether petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling because of egregious 
conduct by counsel); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
petitioner entitled to equitable tolling because of counsel’s “sufficiently egregious” mis-
conduct); Fonesca v. Hall, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that peti-
tioner entitled to equitable tolling because of the “egregious . . . misconduct” of habeas 
counsel). 
116 Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 921–22 (9th Cir. 2003) (remanding for determination of 
whether petitioner’s mental illness constitutes an “extraordinary circumstance” which 
would justify equitable tolling); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 
(9th Cir. 1998) (holding that equitable tolling was warranted because of petitioner’s 
mental incompetency). 
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deadline, either through adequate law library or legal assistance facil-
ities or court notification.117  But prior to Holland, lower courts gener-
ally assumed a lack of post-conviction counsel or post-conviction 
counsel’s miscalculation of the statute of limitations does not provide 
a basis for equitable tolling because such circumstance is not “ex-
traordinary” given the lack of a constitutional right to post-conviction 
counsel.118  Indeed, in Holland, the majority seems to affirm this ap-
proach, acknowledging that “a garden variety claim of excusable neg-
lect, . . . such as a simple ‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer to miss a 
filing deadline . . . does not warrant equitable tolling.”119  But at the 
same time, the Court observes that sufficiently egregious attorney er-
ror may qualify as an “extraordinary” circumstance justifying equita-
ble tolling.120  Thus, the Court remanded the case to the Eleventh 
Circuit for further findings and possible proceedings on the issue.121 
 
117 Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 967 (9th Cir. 2006) (remanding for evidentiary hearing to 
decide whether petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling because of insufficient legal 
resources in prison law library); Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1028 
(9th Cir. 2005) (finding equitable tolling appropriate where petitioner was not allowed 
access to his legal files for eleven months); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921, 926 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (remanding to determine if equitable tolling was warranted because petitioner 
was deprived of access to his legal files for eighty-two days); Phillips v. Donnelly, 216 F.3d 
508, 511 (5th Cir. 2000) (remanding to determine whether equitable tolling was war-
ranted due to a four-month delay in notifying petitioner of denial of habeas petition). 
118 Howell v. Crosby, 415 F.3d 1250, 1251 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding equitable tolling inap-
propriate even though counsel filed a state petition for post-conviction relief two months 
after the federal deadline); Lovato v. Suthers, 42 F. App’x 400, 402 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(holding equitable tolling not warranted even when petitioner missed the filing deadline 
because a public defender advised him to wait until after a proportionality review); Beery 
v. Ault, 312 F.3d 948, 952 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding equitable tolling not warranted when 
counsel took six months to inform petitioner that motion for appointment of post-
conviction counsel had been denied); Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 
2001) (finding equitable tolling unavailable for miscalculation by counsel of the limita-
tions period); Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 F.3d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding counsel’s 
failure to understand the one-year statute of limitations under AEDPA did not warrant 
equitable tolling). 
119 Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2564 (2010) (internal citations omitted). 
120 Id. (noting that counsel not only failed to file Holland’s petition on time and appeared 
unaware of the deadline to do so—factors which, alone, “might suggest simple negli-
gence”—but also failed to file on time despite Holland’s many letters emphasizing the 
importance of doing so; counsel failed to research the proper filing date despite Hol-
land’s letters identifying the correct authority for determining that date; counsel also 
failed to inform Holland in a timely manner that the Florida Supreme Court had denied 
his petition, thus retriggering AEDPA’s one-year clock with twelve days remaining, despite 
Holland’s repeated requests for this information; and failed to communicate with Hol-
land over a period of years, despite Holland’s repeated attempts to do so). 
121 Id. at 2565 (noting that the Eleventh Circuit erroneously concluded equitable tolling was 
per se inapplicable based on attorney error and the district court erroneously concluded 
that Holland had failed to exercise due diligence). 
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This decision opens the door to further litigation regarding the 
effect of attorney error—or perhaps even the denial of counsel alto-
gether in an unusually complicated case—on the availability of equit-
able tolling in a particular case.  Again, these are arguments that a 
typical pro se inmate is ill-equipped to make on his own behalf, but 
that could ultimately make the difference between dismissal of a peti-
tion as untimely and judicial review on the merits. 
Due—or reasonable—diligence, on the other hand, at least until 
Holland, requires more than identifying an objective circumstance 
that impeded a pro se litigant’s preparation of his federal petition.  
For example, some courts have held that a potentially extraordinary 
circumstance—such as a six-week prison lockdown that precludes law 
library access—that arises at the start of the one-year limitations period 
does not justify tolling because a diligent petitioner still has an op-
portunity to make up for the lost time.122  By contrast, the same six-
week lockdown that occurs one month before the filing deadline may 
justify six weeks of equitable tolling.123  Thus, again, a pro se inmate 
seeking equitable tolling based on a circumstance beyond his control 
must take care to demonstrate adequate causation, which is an inhe-
rently legal showing and one he may be hard-pressed to plead suffi-
ciently without assistance of counsel.  Again, the consequence of fail-
ing to plead adequately will be dismissal of a petition as untimely, 
regardless of the merits of the claims raised therein. 
D.  The Delicate Interplay Between AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations and Other 
Procedural Doctrines 
The complexity of calculating AEDPA’s statute of limitations mul-
tiplies exponentially in light of other procedural requirements under 
the statute.  For the typical pro se inmate, the interplay between these 
procedural doctrines can convert an otherwise herculean task to a lit-
 
122 See, e.g., Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker, 255 F.3d 65, 67, 75–76 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding 
equitable tolling unavailable for a petitioner who spent twenty-two days in solitary con-
finement and without access to legal materials at outset of the one-year limitations pe-
riod); Pfeil v. Everett, 9 F. App’x 973, 979–80 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding equitable tolling 
not warranted for lockdown because petitioner had eight months after the lockdown 
ended to pursue his claims).  But cf. Giraldes v. Ramirez-Palmer, No. C98-2757SI(PR), 
1998 WL 775085, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (finding a lockdown over eleven months into a 
petitioner’s one-year deadline did not warrant equitable tolling because petitioner had 
time prior to the lockdown to work on his petition). 
123 United States ex rel. Strong v. Hulick, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1038–40 (N.D. Ill. 2008) 
(finding equitable tolling warranted because petitioner was incorrectly informed of dead-
line, was in lockdown for fifteen of the twenty-three weeks immediately preceding his fil-
ing deadline, and was not given priority access to the law library when lockdown ended). 
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erally impossible one.  The primary culprits are the exhaustion re-
quirement, prohibition on second or successive petitions, and, to a 
lesser extent, the procedural default doctrine. 
1. The Exhaustion Requirement 
The exhaustion requirement, which is founded on principles of 
federalism, requires state inmates to present each habeas claim to the 
highest state court before filing in federal court.  The doctrine pre-
dates AEDPA and AEDPA did little to change it.124  But AEDPA’s sta-
tute of limitations significantly complicates the potential conse-
quences of the exhaustion requirement.  Some problems are simply a 
matter of statutory mechanics.  Under the pre-AEDPA decision in 
Rose v. Lundy,125 federal courts were required to dismiss “without pre-
judice” a mixed petition, i.e., one that contains both exhausted and 
unexhausted claims.  In theory, the petitioner then would be able to 
return to state court to finish exhausting the claims and, then, assum-
ing the state court provides no relief, re-file the federal petition.126  
The dilemma, post-AEDPA is that, as discussed, the statute of limita-
tions is not tolled during the period of time in which a federal peti-
tion is pending in federal court.127  Thus, by the time a district court 
decides to dismiss a petition as mixed under Rose v. Lundy because 
some of the claims are unexhausted, or as entirely unexhausted, the 
statute of limitations often has run.  As a result, the petitioner will be 
time-barred from re-filing the federal petition after exhausting all of 
the claims.  In Rhines v. Weber, the Supreme Court noted: 
 
124 Post-AEDPA, if a federal habeas petition contains an unexhausted claim that the court 
would otherwise be required to dismiss for failure to exhaust, the court may nonetheless 
deny the petition on the merits if it determines the claim has no merit.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(b)(2) (2006).  The court’s authority to consider an unexhausted claim is also sub-
ject to an express waiver by the state of the exhaustion requirement.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(b)(3). 
125 455 U.S. 509 (1982). 
126 Id. at 510; see Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 273–74 (2005) (“[Lundy] imposed a re-
quirement of ‘total exhaustion’ and directed federal courts to effectuate that require-
ment by dismissing mixed petitions without prejudice and allowing petitioners to return 
to state court to present the unexhausted claims to that court in the first in-
stance. . . . [P]etitioners who returned to state court to exhaust their previously unex-
hausted claims could come back to federal court to present their perfected petitions with 
relative ease.  See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 486 (2000) (dismissal without prejudice 
under Lundy ‘contemplated that the prisoner could return to federal court after the re-
quisite exhaustion’).”); 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 36, at § 5.2[b][v] n.97. 
127 See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181–82 (2001) (holding that the statute of limitations 
was not tolled while petitioner’s first § 2254 petition was pending). 
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The problem is not limited to petitioners who file close to the AEDPA 
deadline.  Even a petitioner who files early will have no way of controlling 
when the district court will resolve the question of exhaustion.  Thus, 
whether a petitioner ever receives federal review of his claims may turn 
on which district court happens to hear his case.128 
In attempt to address this dilemma, the Court in Rhines unanim-
ously embraced a stay-and-abeyance procedure.129  This procedure al-
lows the district court to stay a mixed petition and hold it in abeyance 
while the petitioner returns to state court to finish exhausting.130  
Once the petitioner has finished exhausting his claims in state court, 
the district court will lift the stay and consider the entire petition.131  
But, while the district court has discretion to give a petitioner the op-
tion to stay and hold in abeyance his petition before dismissing it, the 
court is under no obligation to advise the petitioner that a failure to 
accept its stay-and-abeyance offer will likely foreclose later habeas re-
view on timeliness grounds.132  Tellingly, the Supreme Court con-
cluded it unfair to impose the burden of making that difficult deter-
mination on the district court.133  Thus, a petitioner may opt to 
dismiss the petition in its entirety without realizing that, in so doing, 
he is forever closing the courthouse doors on himself.  The pro se pe-
titioner, unschooled in the complexities of the statute of limitations 
mechanics, is particularly vulnerable to such poor decision making. 
Nor does the stay-and-abeyance procedure offer any relief to a pe-
titioner who has filed an entirely unexhausted, rather than mixed, 
petition.134  In that case, the district court has no choice but to dismiss 
the petition in its entirety, regardless of whether the petitioner will 
subsequently be time-barred from re-filing.135  Thus, the pro se peti-
 
128 Rhines, 544 U.S. at 275. 
129 Id. at 277–79. 
130 Id. at 275. 
131 Id. at 275–76. 
132 Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (holding that federal district judges are not obli-
gated to warn petitioner that federal claims would be time-barred); Brambles v. Duncan, 
412 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that a court is not obligated to inform peti-
tioner of what he must do to invoke stay-and-abey procedure or that federal claims would 
be time-barred when he returns to federal court). 
133 See Pliler, 542 U.S. at 232 (explaining refusal to “force upon district judges the potentially 
burdensome, time-consuming, and fact intensive task” of determining whether limitations 
period has run). 
134 See Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that district judges 
have discretion to grant a stay-and-abeyance while unexhausted claims are exhausted, but 
declining to extend Rhines to situations where the petition contains only unexhausted 
claims, even where there may be exhausted claims that could be added); Jiminez v. Rice, 
276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of petition on ground that it con-
tained only unexhausted claims). 
135 Jiminez, 276 F.3d at 481. 
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tioner unfamiliar with the exhaustion requirement who acts diligently 
in filing a timely federal petition will be barred from federal review 
because the statute of limitations will have expired.  AEDPA’s statuto-
ry tolling provision for state collateral proceedings, discussed supra, 
will be useless to him because it is impossible to toll an already-
expired limitations period.136 
The statute of limitations complicates the exhaustion requirement 
for the pro se litigant in yet another manner, one for which the Su-
preme Court has not attempted to craft a remedy.  As discussed, 
AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision set forth under § 2244(d)(1) 
stops the one-year clock while the petitioner is exhausting potential 
federal claims, i.e., while state post-conviction petitions are pending.  
But the statute of limitations is not tolled until the petitioner actually 
files a state petition.  The clock will continue to run during the time 
in which the petitioner is researching and preparing that petition.  A 
problem arises in states that provide inmates with more than one year 
to seek post-conviction relief.137  Unless the inmate is sophisticated 
enough to realize at the threshold of his incarceration both that (1) 
the federal deadline is one-year from the date the conviction be-
comes final; and (2) that time period will continue to run until the 
inmate files a state post-conviction petition, despite acting diligently 
and timely filing under state law, he will still unwittingly miss 
AEDPA’s deadline.  Self-described “jailhouse lawyer” Thomas 
O’Bryant, who authored a symposium piece for the Harvard Civil 
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Journal in 2006 that powerfully describes 
his own experience missing the AEDPA deadline and the virtual im-
possibility of filing a timely federal petition from within the Florida 
Department of Corrections, writes: 
[P]risoners begin preparing for state post-conviction remedies under 
the mistaken belief that they may use the entire two-year period [allotted 
under Florida state law] before filing their post-conviction motion in the 
state court without missing any important deadlines. 
I have been asked many times by prisoners who are out of time for 
seeking federal habeas review, “How can I have only one year to file a 
federal habeas corpus when I can’t file it until after I finish my state re-
 
136 See supra Part I.C.4. 
137 See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850 (instructing that post-conviction motions are first filed in 
trial court, within two years of the date the conviction becomes final); N.J. RULE 3:22-
12(a)(1) (“no petition shall be filed pursuant to this rule more than five years after the 
date of entry pursuant to Rule 3:21-5 of the judgment of conviction that is being chal-
lenged”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. P. § 7-103(b) (West, Westlaw through ch. 1 & 2 of the 
2012 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) (petitions must be filed within ten years of the sen-
tence imposition). 
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medies, and I have two years to file state post-conviction motions?  
Should my federal time not begin after I finish with my state post-
conviction remedies?”  Such a situation does not seem logical, but it is 
the situation.138 
2. AEDPA’s Proscription on Second or Successive Petitions 
A federal petition that attacks the same criminal judgment as a 
prior petition attacked and that the district court decided on the me-
rits, rather than procedural grounds, is considered “second or succes-
sive.”139  Before AEDPA’s enactment, federal courts assessed second or 
successive petitions in two ways.  If the successive petition raised 
claims distinct from those presented in the first petition and the State 
objected that the petition was an “abuse of the writ,” the inmate had 
to show “cause” for not raising the claim in the previous petition and 
that he would suffer “prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of jus-
tice” if the court declined to review the claim.140  If, on the other 
hand, the petitioner sought to raise a claim brought in a previous pe-
tition that the court had decided on the merits, the court would con-
sider the claim only where the inmate demonstrated “cause and pre-
judice” and the “ends of justice” so warranted.141  But federal courts 
applied the same cause-and-prejudice exception that applied to new 
claims analysis. 
AEDPA implemented significant changes to both the governing 
procedures and substantive standards for second or successive peti-
tions.  In so doing, the revised statute dramatically restricted a peti-
tioner’s ability to file such a petition.  First, the statute entirely prohi-
bits filing a successive petition containing the same claims as 
presented in the initial petition.  Procedurally, a petitioner seeking to 
file a second or successive petition that presents new claims beyond 
those raised in the first petition must first obtain authorization from a 
three-judge circuit panel by showing that the petition satisfies 
AEDPA’s substantive criteria.142  The court of appeals must act on the 
application for authorization within thirty days and its decision is not 
 
138 Thomas C. O’Bryant, The Great Unobtainable Writ:  Indigent Pro Se Litigation After the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 333 (2006). 
139 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 40, at § 28.3[b].  
140 See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494–95 (1991); 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 40, at 
§ 28.3[a]. 
141 See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992) (citation and emphasis omitted); 2 HERTZ 
& LIEBMAN, supra note 40, at § 28.2[b]. 
142 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A)–(C) (2006). 
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appealable, i.e., cannot be the basis for a petition for rehearing or pe-
tition for certiorari.143 
Substantively, AEDPA’s standards for issuance of an order autho-
rizing a second or successive petition are very high.  The petitioner 
must show either: 
(A) . . . that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made re-
troactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was 
previously unavailable; or 
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered 
previously through the exercise of due diligence; and 
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the 
evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder 
would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense [i.e., ac-
tual innocence].144 
By significantly restricting the availability of successive petitions, 
AEDPA puts substantial pressure on the petitioner to include all via-
ble claims in the initial petition to ensure federal judicial review.  
This task is a daunting one in light of the one-year time period within 
which the petitioner must file.  Prior to AEDPA, a petitioner was able 
to file an initial petition containing claims that he litigated on direct 
appeal—i.e., claims that required only copying from one pleading to 
another—but then take the time needed to investigate and develop 
new claims that required expansion of the factual record.  Post-
AEDPA, such petitioner must make the tactical decision whether to 
file the petition quickly, with hopes to amend it before the court rules 
on it, to add additional claims, or take the extra time required to 
prepare the additional claims and hope still to comply with the sta-
tute of limitations strictures.  Or the petitioner could knowingly file a 
mixed petition and then avail himself of the stay-and-abeyance 
process described, supra.145  Again, expecting this level of legal sophis-
tication from the average pro se litigant is naïve at best. 
3. Procedural Default 
The doctrine of procedural default also predates AEDPA and was 
unchanged by the statute:  If a claim raised in a federal petition is ex-
hausted, but the state court denied it on an independent and ade-
quate procedural ground rather than its merits, the federal court will 
dismiss it as procedurally defaulted, absent a showing of cause and 
 
143 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D)–(E) (2006). 
144 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2006). 
145 See text accompanying notes 126–129. 
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prejudice or actual innocence.146  If the petitioner did not properly 
exhaust the claim but is now procedurally barred under state law 
from doing so, the claim is also considered procedurally defaulted 
and will be dismissed with prejudice, again, absent a showing of cause 
and prejudice or actual innocence.147  But a federal court will not 
honor a state procedural rule unless it is considered “independent of 
the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.”148  To 
be “independent,” a state rule cannot be interwoven with federal 
law.149  To be “adequate,” the rule must have been firmly established 
and consistently applied at the time it was invoked by the state 
court.150 
State rules that are too inconsistently or arbitrarily applied to bar federal 
review “generally fall into two categories:  (1) rules that have been selec-
tively applied to bar the claims of certain litigants . . . and (2) rules that 
are so unsettled due to ambiguous or changing state authority that apply-
ing them to bar a litigant’s claim is unfair.”151 
Assessment of whether a state procedural rule is independent and 
adequate is often very involved and the governing principles far from 
clear.152  Again, for the average pro se habeas petitioner, the chal-
lenge of understanding this doctrine and effectively countering 
claims of default, all within the one year allotted by the AEDPA, is an 
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible one. 
 
146 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (finding petitioner’s claims procedurally 
barred from federal review due to late filing of state habeas appeal); Wainwright v. Sykes, 
433 U.S. 72 (1977); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
147 Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998) (“Where a defendant has procedurally 
defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct review, the claim may be raised in habeas 
only if the defendant can first demonstrate either ‘cause’ and actual ‘prejudice,’ or that 
he is ‘actually innocent.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
148 Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729; see also Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1126–27 (2011) (find-
ing that California’s time rule requiring state habeas petitioners to file known claims “as 
promptly as the circumstances allow” as applied constitutes an independent state ground 
that is adequate to bar habeas relief in federal court); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 
(1985) (noting that “the state court’s judgment does not rest on an independent state 
ground”). 
149 Walker, 131 S. Ct. at 1127; Ake, 470 U.S. at 75. 
150 Walker, 131 S. Ct. at 1127; Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991); Valerio v. Crawford, 
306 F.3d 742, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
151 Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 583 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 
373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
152 See, e.g., Walker, 131 S. Ct. at 1127–31 (concluding California’s timeliness bar was inde-
pendent and adequate as applied and thus, a basis for procedural default of claims liti-
gant sought to raise in federal petition). 
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E. The Prototypical Inmate 
The procedural complexity of AEDPA litigation, daunting for any 
layperson, is all the more impenetrable for many pro se litigants in 
light of the high rates of illiteracy and mental health problems that 
plague American prison and jail populations.  The Supreme Court, 
itself, has taken as axiomatic the fact that the inmate population suf-
fers from disproportionately high rates of illiteracy and mental health 
problems.153  Empirical data bears out this assumption. 
The Department of Education’s most recent study of inmate lite-
racy rates, based on data collected in 2003, measured three types of 
literacy:  prose, document, and quantitative literacy.154  “Prose litera-
cy” describes “[t]he knowledge and skills needed to search, compre-
hend, and use information from continuous texts[, which would] in-
clude editorials, news stories, brochures, and instructional 
materials.”155  “Document literacy” reflects “[t]he knowledge and skills 
needed to search, comprehend, and use information from nonconti-
nuous texts [and would] include job applications, payroll forms, 
transportation schedules, maps, tables, and drug or food labels.”156  
Lastly, “quantitative literacy” encompasses “[t]he knowledge and 
skills needed to identify and perform computations using numbers 
that are embedded in printed materials[, such as] balancing a check-
book, computing a tip, completing an order form, or determining 
the amount of interest on a loan from an advertisement.157  There 
were four categories of literacy:  below basic, basic, intermediate, and 
proficient.158 
The report did not explicitly evaluate the ability of an inmate to 
read and comprehend complex legal documents, statutes, or case 
law, let alone to understand the intricacies of federal habeas filing 
 
153 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 496–97 
(1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
154 See Elizabeth Greenberg, Eric Dunleavy & Mark Kutner, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Literacy Be-
hind Bars:  Results from the 2003 National Assessment of Adult Literacy Prison Survey, at 




158 Id.  “Below Basic” reflects “an adult [who] has no more than the most simple and con-
crete literacy skills.”  “Basic” means “that an adult has the skills necessary to perform sim-
ple and everyday literacy activities.”  “Intermediate” indicates that an adult is able “to per-
form moderately challenging literacy activities.”  “Proficient” signifies “that an adult has 
the skills necessary to perform more complex and challenging literacy activities. The sep-
arate category, “nonliterate in English,” applies to individuals unable to complete a min-
imum number of basic literacy questions or unable to communicate in English or Span-
ish.  Id. 
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requirements.  But based on the above definitions, such ability would 
implicate primarily prose and, to a lesser extent, quantitative and 
document literacy skills.  Moreover, comprehending and effectively 
wielding federal habeas corpus doctrine would require, at minimum, 
a proficient level of literacy.  The results from the study suggest very 
few individuals behind bars would possess this capacity in that only 
2% showed proficient levels of document and quantitative literacy 
and 3% tested proficient in prose literacy.159  For the remainder of 
inmates, even assuming sufficient access to an up-to-date prison law 
library,160 legal materials pertaining to habeas corpus practice lie far 
beyond the reasonable comprehension of those who need to under-
stand it most:  inmates who are required to function as their own le-
gal counsel in pursuit of the writ. 
Statistics regarding the relative mental health of the inmate popu-
lation in the United States are similarly bleak.  A study released by the 
Department of Justice in 2006 indicated that more than half of all in-
dividuals incarcerated in this country suffer from mental illness.161  
More specifically, more than two-fifths (43%) of state prisoners and 
more than half (54%) of jail inmates reported symptoms of mania.162  
Approximately 23% of state inmates and 30% of those in jail reported 
 
159 Id. at 13.  Forty-one percent had intermediate prose literacy, with 56% at basic or below 
basic.  Forty-eight percent tested at intermediate document literacy, with 50% showing 
basic or below basic.  And only 20% revealed intermediate quantitative literacy, while 
78% tested at basic or below basic.  The study also excludes altogether persons unable to 
communicate in English or Spanish and those with cognitive or mental disabilities that 
prevented literacy testing.  Thus, the results may overstate the overall inmate literacy 
rates.  Id. 
160 See Benjamin R. Dryden, Comment, Technological Leaps and Bounds:  Pro Se Prisoner Litiga-
tion in the Internet Age, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 819, 830–31 (2008) (arguing that constitu-
tional right of access to courts requires internet access for legal research, in so doing cit-
ing states’ dramatic cuts to prison law libraries post-Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 341 (1996), 
and lack of internet access in all such libraries); O’Bryant, supra note 138, at 319–32 (de-
scribing severely limited legal resources available to pro se inmates in Florida, including 
prison library law clerks generally equipped only with a high school diploma, a GED, or 
functional literacy and thirty hours of legal training; jailhouse lawyers who are prohibited 
from, and punished for, possessing other inmates’ legal papers; the virtual absence of 
computers for inmate research; and actual library access limited to once a week). 
161 See DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS 
OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/mhppji.pdf.  Mental health problems were defined by either a recent history or 
symptoms of mental illness within the twelve months prior to the study, which was con-
ducted in mid-2005.  But inmates in mental hospitals or who were otherwise physically or 
mentally unable to complete the study surveys were excluded.  Thus, again, the above sta-
tistics likely under-represent the actual levels of mental illness in prisons and jails.  Id. at 
2. 
162 Id. at 1. 
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symptoms of major depression.163  Insomnia or hypersomnia and per-
sistent anger were the most commonly reported episodes amongst 
those reporting major depression or mania, with nearly half of jail 
inmates reporting such symptoms.164  About 15% of state inmates and 
24% of jail inmates reported symptoms of a psychotic disorder.165  
About 74% of state inmates and 76% of those in jail with a mental 
health condition also met criteria for substance dependence or 
abuse.166  Thus, even in the rare event that an inmate is sufficiently 
equipped educationally to read and understand habeas doctrine, his 
ability to do so may be profoundly impaired by mental illness. 
F. The Impact of AEDPA on the Number of Federal Habeas Petitions Being 
Dismissed on Procedural Grounds, and Thus Failing to Reach Merits 
Review 
Empirical study confirms that, since AEDPA’s enactment, for non-
capital litigants the Great Writ has lost much of its muscle.167  A 2007 
study conducted at Vanderbilt School of Law (“the Vanderbilt study”) 
revealed that federal habeas petitioners lacked assistance of counsel 
in 92.3% of non-capital cases.168  Moreover, under AEDPA, district 
courts have dismissed as untimely 22% of non-capital federal habeas 
petitions.169  Of the time-barred petitioners, only 5.1% had counsel.170  
By contrast, only 4% of capital cases, where habeas petitioners have a 
statutory right to assistance of counsel and, thus, are not required to 
navigate AEDPA’s procedural requirements alone, were dismissed as 
time-barred.171  The rates of non-capital petition dismissal as succes-
sive (7%) or individual claim dismissal as procedurally defaulted 
(13%) approximate pre-AEDPA practice.172  But as with the time-
 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 2. 
165 Id.  A psychotic disorder is shown by signs of delusions or hallucinations during the prior 
year.  Id.  Delusions are indicated by the inmates’ belief that other people were control-
ling their brain or thoughts, could read their mind, or were spying on them.  Id.  Halluci-
nations included reports of seeing things or hearing voices that others did not.  Id. 
166 Id. at 6. 
167 See Habeas Litigation Technical Report, supra note 77, at 8–9. 
168 Id. at 23.  
169 Id. at 57. 
170 Id. at 46. 
171 Id. at 62 (noting “[t]he greater frequency of time-barred cases for non-capital prisoners is 
expected given that unlike death row inmates in most states, non-capital habeas filers na-
vigate the post-conviction process and its deadlines without counsel”); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2261. 
172 NANCY J. KING ET AL., Executive Summary to the Final Technical Report:  Habeas Litiga-
tion in U.S. District Courts:  An Empirical Study of Habeas Corpus Cases Filed by State 
Prisoners Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, at 6 (2007), 
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barred cases, the dismissal rate on successive and default grounds in 
non-capital cases, where petitioners are largely uncounseled, is much 
higher than in capital cases.173  Finally, with respect to the effect of as-
sistance of counsel, the report found that the presence of counsel 
added 11%–49% more time to habeas proceedings than in cases 
where the petitioner lacked counsel.174  The presence of counsel re-
duces the likelihood of early termination of habeas cases,175 which typ-
ically arises with procedural dismissals. 
This data illustrates the devastating effect that the statute of limi-
tations, combined with other procedural doctrines, has had on the 
pro se litigant’s ability to obtain federal court review of the merits of 
claims raised in habeas proceedings.176  More than one in five litigants 
are unable to file within AEDPA’s designated one-year time period.177  
It is unclear what portion of these cases involve litigants who simply 
 
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219558.pdf [hereinafter Executive 
Summary to the Habeas Litigation Technical Report]; Habeas Litigation Technical Re-
port, supra note 77, at 58.  Because the study focused only on district court rulings, its au-
thors acknowledge that the calculated rate of petition dismissal as successive may unders-
tate the actual dismissal rate in light of the gatekeeping role the court of appeals now play 
under AEDPA in authorizing the filing of successive petitions.  Id.  The report indicates 
that the cases involving at least one procedurally defaulted claim are also underreported 
because in some cases where the court had alternative bases for denying the petition, it 
would rule on the merits first, and statute of limitations second, and thus never address 
the procedural default issue.  Id. 
173 Executive Summary to the Habeas Litigation Technical Report, supra note 172, at 6.  The 
study indicates all claims were dismissed as unexhausted in over 10% of non-capital cases, 
as compared to less than 4% of capital cases.  Habeas Litigation Technical Report, supra 
note 77, at 62.  Stays for exhaustion occurred seven times as often in capital cases than in 
non-capital cases.  Id.  Procedural default, however, was invoked as the basis for dismiss-
ing a claim four times as often in capital as in non-capital cases.  Id.  Interestingly, post-
AEDPA, fewer courts are dismissing petitions on exhaustion grounds.  Id. at 57 (reporting 
that, prior to AEDPA, more than half of all claims raised in non-capital cases were dis-
missed without prejudice due to the petitioner’s failure to exhaust in state court; post-
AEDPA, 11% of non-capital cases involve dismissal of claims as unexhausted).  This de-
crease may be attributable to an increasing awareness of the need to exhaust claims—a 
relatively straightforward requirement that does not involve the complex calculations of 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations—and, to a lesser extent, district courts’ post-AEDPA ability 
to stay and hold in abeyance the exhausted claims in a mixed petition, while the petition-
er returns to state court to exhaust the remaining claims.  See id. at 57–58 (reporting that 
district courts stayed cases to allow a petitioner to exhaust unexhausted claims in only 
2.5% of non-capital cases, and that these stays occurred in less than one-quarter of the 
districts). 
174 Id. at 73. 
175 Id. 
176 See Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Essay, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal 
Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 793 (2009) (citing Habeas Litigation Technical Report, su-
pra note 77, as evidence that federal habeas review of state criminal judgments no longer 
works). 
177 Habeas Litigation Technical Report, supra note 77, at 46, 57. 
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miss the deadline due to failure of calculation or those who are liter-
ally unable to file within the year allotted to them while also satisfying 
AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement.  Regardless, a substantial portion 
of habeas petitions never clear the courthouse doors for substantive 
review of the claims raised within them. 
As a result of AEDPA’s dramatic effect on the efficacy of the Great 
Writ for inmates seeking federal post-conviction review of their crim-
inal judgments, some scholars have called for the abolition of federal 
habeas corpus proceedings altogether, arguing that judicial resources 
are better spent at the front end, providing defendants with compe-
tent trial and appellate counsel.178  But the dire state of implementa-
tion of Gideon’s mandate amplifies the critical need for providing 
counsel in habeas corpus proceedings.179  With trial and appellate 
counsel stretched so thin, errors by even the most able and diligent of 
counsel are inevitable.  And the federal habeas remedy may be the 
only chance the indigent inmate has at achieving the constitutional 
mandate of effective assistance of counsel, albeit later in the process 
than contemplated by the Sixth Amendment.  Moreover, even if the 
judiciary had the resources and motivation to amply animate Gideon, 
it is axiomatic that humans err.  There will always be cases in which a 
lawyer’s personal circumstances—physical or emotional issues or even 
a temporary overextension within his or her caseload—will prevent 
competent representation.  Affected clients are entitled to a mea-
ningful remedy.  Recognition of a right to counsel based on access to 
the courts would provide that remedy. 
II.  ACCESS-TO-THE-COURTS DOCTRINE 
As discussed in the Introduction and Part I, this Article argues for 
recognition of a limited right to counsel for habeas litigants to ensure 
their constitutional right of access to the courts.  Pre-AEDPA attempts 
at convincing the Supreme Court to recognize a right to counsel of 
any dimension in state post-conviction proceedings were unsuccess-
ful.180  But in light of the inordinate complexity AEDPA introduced to 
 
178 See Hoffmann & King supra note 176, at 795 (advocating for abolition of federal review 
and reallocation of resources to improve efficacy of trial court representation). 
179  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  
180 See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987) (rejecting argument that inmates 
have a constitutional right to counsel during post-conviction review and thus, that proce-
dures under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), apply to state-created right to 
counsel on post-conviction review); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (noting, 
in a plurality decision, that the holding of Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, extends to 
capital cases in Virginia). 
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federal habeas practice and the negative impact it has had on pro se 
litigants, this Article urges a revisiting of that precedent to the extent 
federal courts rely on it failing to embrace a right to counsel in feder-
al habeas proceedings.  To do so first requires an overview of the con-
tours of access-to-the-courts doctrine. 
Justice Harlan once described the access doctrine as fundamental 
to the rule of law in that the rule of law assumes that (1) the law will 
be enforced; and (2) individuals who suffer wrongs under the law will 
be able to have access to the appropriate forum, primarily courts, for 
enforcement of the law.181  The access cases, either explicitly or impli-
citly, incorporate these two assumptions and address measures neces-
sary to ensure that the indigent be able to get into court to enforce 
their legal rights.  The Supreme Court has recognized an inmate’s 
constitutional right to gain access to the courts to litigate post-
conviction and civil rights proceedings.182 
The right of access derives from both equal protection and due 
process jurisprudence, though the Court has not clearly articulated 
the nature of this origin.183  The right itself emerged from both con-
 
181 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374–75 (1971) (holding due process of law prohi-
bited state from denying indigent access to court for divorce proceedings based on inabil-
ity to pay court fees and costs); see also Cruz v. Hauck, 475 F.2d 475, 476 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(describing the right to access to the courts as “one of, perhaps the, fundamental right”). 
182 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (holding that the right of access requires 
prisons “to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers” by 
providing inmates with adequate law libraries or assistance from those with legal training; 
see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (noting that Bounds requires tools be pro-
vided to inmates to attack sentences, directly or collaterally, and to challenge conditions 
of confinement). 
183 See Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 11 n.6 (“The prisoner’s right of access has been described as a 
consequence of the right to due process of law, see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 
419 (1974), and as an aspect of equal protection, see Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 
557 (1987).”).  The Court invokes equal protection principles in evaluating whether state 
laws or policies discriminate between the indigent and the financially able, see for exam-
ple, Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961) (holding that “to interpose any financial 
consideration between an indigent prisoner of the [s]tate and his exercise of a state right 
to sue for his liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal protection of the laws”).  But the 
Court turns to the due process doctrine in assessing whether state action functions to 
preclude an individual from seeking relief in a judicial forum, see for example, Procunier, 
416 U.S. at 419 (declaring invalid “[r]egulations and practices that unjustifiably obstruct 
the availability of professional representation” as violating the corollary to “[t]he constitu-
tional guarantee of due process of law . . . that prisoners be afforded access to the courts 
in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their con-
stitutional rights”).  Often, challenged laws or policies necessarily implicate both doc-
trines.  See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16–17 (1956) (holding that where states 
provide for statutory right to appeal a criminal conviction, the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit erecting any financial barriers 
that might prevent the indigent from appealing, e.g., requiring indigent to purchase trial 
transcripts). 
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stitutional challenges to procedural requirements that prevent in-
mates from pursuing post-conviction litigation as well as right to 
counsel jurisprudence.184  Today, though still fairly ill-defined, the 
access right requires more than mere passivity on the states’ part.  Ra-
ther, in certain circumstances the right requires states to take affirma-
tive measures to ensure meaningful access to the indigent.  
“[M]eaningful access to the courts is the touchstone” of the right.185  
The right has evolved in several stages. 
A. Early Access Cases 
The Supreme Court first invoked the access-to-the-courts doctrine 
in 1941, in Ex parte Hull,186 to prohibit state action that directly ob-
structs a pro se inmate’s ability to file a post-conviction petition.  In 
Hull, the Court held unconstitutional a state prison regulation that 
authorized prison officials to intercept inmate habeas corpus peti-
tions that were thought to be improperly prepared.187  The Court 
concluded: 
[T]he state and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner’s right to 
apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.  Whether a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus addressed to a federal court is properly drawn 
and what allegations it must contain are questions for that court alone to 
determine.188 
 
184 See, e.g., Boddie, 401 U.S. at 371–383 (finding state fees and costs required to obtain a di-
vorce violated indigent litigants’ constitutional right to access to the courts); Draper v. 
Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (invalidating Washington rules as applied that condi-
tion appeal on trial court’s conclusion that claims presented therein are nonfrivolous); 
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (invalidating Indiana Supreme Court rules that ena-
ble only a public defender, rather than indigent inmate seeking to proceed pro se, to ob-
tain transcripts required in order to appeal from denial of writ of error coram nobis); 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (recognizing that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause and Sixth Amendment require assistance of counsel for non-
capital criminal defendants); Smith, 365 U.S. 708 (invalidating Iowa law requiring pay-
ment of filing fee in order to file state habeas petition); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 
(1959) (invalidating Ohio procedure requiring payment of filing fee in order to seek dis-
cretionary review with state supreme court); Griffin, 351 U.S. 12 (invalidating state law 
that required non-capital defendants to purchase their own trial transcripts for appeal as 
violating Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection and due process guarantees); Powell 
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause and Sixth Amendment require assistance of counsel for capital defen-
dants). 
185 Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
186 312 U.S. 546 (1941); see also Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821–22 (recognizing Hull as the advent of 
the access-to-the-courts doctrine). 
187 Hull, 312 U.S. at 548–49. 
188 Id. at 549. 
Apr. 2012] POST-AEDPA RIGHT TO COUNSEL 1259 
 
Almost thirty years later, the Supreme Court held that the access 
right guarantees more than merely the literal right to file documents 
in court.189  In Johnson v. Avery, the petitioner challenged a state pris-
on regulation that barred inmates from assisting one another in 
preparation of habeas petitions.190  The Court held that, unless the 
state or some other source provides legal help to indigent prisoners, 
the court cannot indirectly obstruct access by preventing jailhouse law-
yers from preparing habeas petitions for other indigent prisoners.191  
The Court underscored that: 
Since the basic purpose of the writ is to enable those unlawfully incarce-
rated to obtain their freedom, it is fundamental that access of prisoners 
to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints may not be 
denied or obstructed.192 
Without the assistance of a jailhouse lawyer, the pro se habeas pe-
titioner’s possibly valid constitutional claims would never reach a 
court for consideration.193  The Court noted that the problem of 
access is particularly acute for the “high percentage of persons [in 
jails and prisons] who are totally or functionally illiterate, whose edu-
cational attainments are slight, and whose intelligence is limited.”194  
In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas elaborated: 
In a community where illiteracy and mental deficiency is notoriously 
high, it is not enough to ask the prisoner to be his own lawyer.  Without 
the assistance of fellow prisoners, some meritorious claims would never 
see the light of a courtroom.  In cases where that assistance succeeds, it 
speaks for itself.  And even in cases where it fails, it may provide a neces-
sary medium of expression.195 
Following Avery, the Court in Younger v. Gilmore upheld in a two-
paragraph per curiam opinion the lower court’s judgment requiring 
California officials to provide indigent inmates with access to a rea-
sonably adequate law library for preparation of legal actions.196  Sev-
eral years later, the Court unanimously extended Avery to cover assis-
tance by fellow inmates in civil rights actions.197  The Court rejected 
the state’s attempt to distinguish the relative importance of civil 
 
189 See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). 
190 Id. at 484. 
191 Id. at 490. 
192 Id. at 485. 
193 Id. at 487 (quoting the district court opinion, Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783, 784 
(M.D. Tenn. 1966)). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 496–97 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
196 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam), aff’g Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 
1970). 
197 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577–80 (1974). 
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rights actions from habeas petitions, noting that “both actions serve 
to protect basic constitutional rights.”198  The Court observed: 
The right of access to the courts, upon which Avery was premised, is 
founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be 
denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning 
violations of fundamental constitutional rights. . . . The recognition by 
this Court that prisoners have certain constitutional rights which can be 
protected by civil rights actions would be diluted if inmates, often “totally 
or functionally illiterate,” were unable to articulate their complaints to 
the courts.199 
B. Right to Counsel Cases 
As the jurisprudence regarding the access-to-the-courts right was 
evolving, the Supreme Court also began to define the parameters of 
the indigent criminal defendant’s right to assistance of counsel.  The 
right to counsel cases, though initially not analyzed in terms of access 
to the courts, echoed the same concepts of fairness and access to jus-
tice as the access cases.  Indeed, recognizing the similarity in constitu-
tional underpinnings, the Supreme Court would eventually fold this 
jurisprudence into its access-to-the-courts case law.  Prior to this doc-
trinal merger, the right to counsel jurisprudence developed as fol-
lows. 
1. Right to Counsel at Trial 
In Powell v. Alabama, the Court held the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause and Sixth Amendment require assistance of 
counsel for capital defendants.200  In so holding, Justice Sutherland 
observed that “[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of lit-
tle avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”201  
Rather, both the “intelligent and educated layman” and the “ignorant 
and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect” “require[] the guiding 
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against [them].”202 
Six years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment requires appointment of counsel at government ex-
pense for every indigent defendant in federal court who faces loss of 
life or liberty, unless the defendant waives that right.203  In so holding, 
 
198 Id. at 579. 
199 Id. 
200 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
201 Id. at 68–69. 
202 Id. at 69. 
203 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938). 
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the Court observed that the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel 
clause 
[E]mbodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average 
defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself 
when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, 
wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned coun-
sel.  That which is simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer, to the un-
trained layman may appear intricate, complex and mysterious. 204 
Similarly, in extending Powell to non-capital defendants in Gideon v. 
Wainright, the Court noted: 
[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person [hauled] into 
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial un-
less counsel is provided for him.  This seems to us to be an obvious 
truth.205 
2. Right to Counsel on Appeal 
The right to counsel on direct appeal does not find its origin in 
the Sixth Amendment.  In fact, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that, unlike the Sixth Amendment right to trial, a criminal de-
fendant does not have a constitutional right to appeal his convic-
tion.206  Instead, the right to direct appellate review is entirely a crea-
ture of statute.207  Nonetheless, where states decide to provide for a 
statutory right to appeal, the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit imposing any finan-
cial barriers that might prevent the indigent from appealing.208 
In Griffin v. Illinois, petitioners challenged a state law that required 
non-capital defendants to purchase their own trial transcripts.209  In 
finding the law violated due process and equal protection guarantees, 
the Court noted that, once a state decides to provide for a right to 
 
204 Id. 
205 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
206 Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 160–61 (2000) (finding no constitu-
tional right to represent oneself on appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) 
(Black, J., plurality opinion); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 688 (1894).  But cf. McCoy 
v. Court of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 429, 436 (1988) (“If a convicted defendant elects to 
appeal, he retains the Sixth Amendment right to representation by competent coun-
sel . . . .”). 
207 Martinez, 528 U.S. at 160 (internal citation omitted). 
208 Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18–19 (Black, J., plurality opinion). 
209 Id. at 14.  Illinois law required appellants who sought to raise non-constitutional errors to 
pay for their own transcripts.  Id.  To the extent an appellant intended to allege constitu-
tional errors, there was no charge.  Id. 
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appeal, it cannot do so in a way that discriminates against convicted 
defendants who happen to be poor:210 
There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends 
on the amount of money he has.  Destitute defendants must be afforded 
as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to 
buy transcripts.211 
After Griffin, the Court held other financial obstacles to direct ap-
peal to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.  These barriers included 
a state law permitting only public defenders to obtain free transcripts 
of a hearing on a coram nobis application,212 which thus denied indi-
gent appellants transcripts for appeal unless counsel ordered them;213 
a requirement that an indigent defendant satisfy the trial judge that 
his appeal has merit before obtaining free transcripts;214 and filing 
fees to process a state habeas petition215 or to seek review from the 
state supreme court.216 
In 1963, the Supreme Court in Douglas v. California extended the 
reasoning of Griffin and its progeny217 to hold that where a state pro-
vides for a right to appeal criminal convictions, the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses require the state also to provide the indi-
gent appellant with assistance of counsel.218  At issue in Douglas was a 
California law that required appellate courts to make a threshold as-
sessment of the merits of an appeal before deciding to appoint coun-
sel to assist a defendant on direct appeal.219  The Court held that 
when an indigent appellant must “run th[e] gantlet of a preliminary 
showing of merit, the right to appeal does not comport with fair pro-
cedure.”220  In such a case, 
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment 
where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of coun-
sel’s examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of 
arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a pre-
 
210 Id. at 18–19. 
211 Id. at 19. 
212 A writ of coram nobis, as authorized by the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006), permits 
defendants to seek correction of purely factual errors in their cases but does not allow re-
view of substantive legal issues.  See United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67–68 (1914) (de-
scribing common law precedent for, and function of, writs of coram nobis). 
213 Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480–81 (1963). 
214 Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 494–95 (1963). 
215 Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 708 (1961). 
216 Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 253 (1959). 
217 The Court decided Draper, Douglas, and Lane on the same day.  See Draper, 372 U.S. 487; 
Lane, 372 U.S. 477; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
218 Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357–58. 
219 Id. at 354–56. 
220 Id. at 357. 
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liminary determination that his case is without merit, is forced to shift for 
himself.  The indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hid-
den, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a 
meaningful appeal.221 
In 1974, the Supreme Court in Ross v. Moffitt declined to extend 
Douglas to discretionary appeals.222  In so holding, the Court empha-
sized that an indigent appellant seeking the discretionary review of a 
supreme court already has the benefit of attorney work-product from 
the first appeal, which he need only duplicate with a request for high 
court review.223  Thus, although undoubtedly helpful, assistance of 
counsel is not constitutionally required.224  The Court noted: 
[The state’s constitutional duty] is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that 
may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort 
to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an 
adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the 
[s]tate’s appellate process.225 
The Court underscored, however, that states must “assure the indi-
gent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fair-
ly.”226 
At its core then, the right to counsel cases derive from a judicial 
conviction that the courthouse doors will not close to judicial review 
of claims raised by unrepresented inmates simply by virtue of the fact 
that they lack the requisite legal skills to navigate the legal process.  
Thus, where counsel is essential either to engage in trial advocacy or 
to frame new claims on appeal, the right to counsel attaches. 
C.  Bridging Access-to-the-Courts and Right to Counsel Doctrines:  Bounds v. 
Smith 
In 1977, the Supreme Court formally merged the early access-to-
the-courts cases with its right to counsel jurisprudence to articulate 
an access doctrine of broader application.  In Bounds v. Smith,227 state 
inmates filed civil suit against the State arguing their constitutional 
right of access to the courts required the State to provide adequate 
prison law library facilities or other legal assistance in habeas litiga-
tion.228  The Court agreed, holding that in some situations the access 
 
221 Id. at 357–58. 
222 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974). 
223 Id. at 615. 
224 Id. at 616. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
227 430 U.S. 817 (1977). 
228 Id. at 818. 
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right places an affirmative obligation on states to develop and im-
plement “remedial measures to insure that inmate access to the 
courts is adequate, effective, and meaningful.”229  In so concluding, 
the Court invoked both early access-to-the-courts and right to counsel 
precedent.230 
The Court identified the core of its prior decisions striking down 
financial obstacles to the appellate process—including lack of coun-
sel—as essential to ensure the indigent access to a meaningful appeal 
from their convictions.231  Justice Marshall, writing for the six-Justice 
majority, rejected the State’s attempt to limit its reading of Johnson v. 
Avery232 and Wolff v. McDonnell.233  Rather, the majority observed that at 
issue in those cases was whether state policies prohibiting inmates 
from assisting one another in preparing habeas and civil rights ac-
tions violated the access rights of “ignorant and illiterate” inmates 
“without adequate justification.”234  Because in both cases such in-
mates were unable to present their written claims to the courts, their 
“constitutional right to help” required at minimum permitting assis-
tance from fellow, literate inmates.235  The Court noted that Johnson 
and Wolff “did not attempt to set forth the full breadth of the right of 
access.”236  Indeed, neither case precluded “requiring additional 
 
229 Id. at 822. 
230 Id. at 822–25. 
231 See id. at 822–23 (citing Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959) (holding that indigent 
inmates must be able to file appeals without payment of docket fees); Mayer v. City of 
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 198–99 (1971) (requiring state to provide transcript of non-felony 
trial); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 370–71 (1969) (ruling that a state is required 
to provide transcript of habeas corpus hearing); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42–43 
(1967) (holding that a state is required to provide transcript of preliminary hearing); Ri-
naldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310–11 (1966) (finding unconstitutional a state require-
ment that prisoners reimburse the state for the cost of trial transcripts only if they are un-
successful on appeal); Long v. Dist. Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192, 194–95 (1966) 
(mandating that a state provide transcript of post-conviction proceeding); Draper v. 
Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 499–500 (1963) (ruling that trial transcript provision cannot 
be conditioned on court approval); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1963) (decid-
ing that a state officer cannot require public defender’s approval to obtain coram nobis 
transcript); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963) (recognizing the right to 
counsel on direct appeal); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 713–14 (1961) (holding that 
indigent inmates must be able to file habeas petitions without payment of docket fees); 
Eskridge v. Wash. Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214, 216 (1958) (ruling that trial transcript provi-
sion cannot be conditioned on court approval); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19–20 
(1956) (concluding that state must supply trial records to indigent inmates seeking appel-
late review). 
232 393 U.S. 483 (1969). 
233 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
234 Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823–24. 
235 Id. at 823–24 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
236 Id. at 824. 
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measures to assure meaningful access to inmates able to present their 
own cases.”237 
The Court further noted that it had long imposed affirmative ob-
ligations on states to guarantee meaningful court access to all in-
mates.238 
[T]he cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total 
denial. . . . The inquiry is . . . whether law libraries or other forms of legal 
assistance are needed to give prisoners a reasonably adequate opportuni-
ty to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to 
the courts.239 
Justice Marshall observed that “it would verge on incompetence” 
for an attorney to file an initial pleading without researching relevant 
procedural and substantive law.240  And if a lawyer must perform such 
tasks, so, too must the pro se inmate.241  Indeed, it is likely even more 
important that the pro se litigant “set forth a nonfrivolous claim 
meeting all procedural prerequisites” to avoid early dismissal.242  
Likewise, without an adequate library or legal assistance, the pro se 
litigant is left defenseless to answer to the respondent’s pleadings.243  
The situation is particularly compelling in habeas proceedings, where 
the petitioner often seeks to raise claims that trial or appellate coun-
sel did not litigate and thus, has no legal work product off of which to 
work.244 
But the Court emphasized that states have broad discretion in en-
suring constitutionally adequate access to the courts for inmates.245  
Providing a law library is but one means of doing so, and states are 
encouraged to experiment with alternate approaches.246  The relevant 
inquiry is what steps are necessary “to give prisoners a reasonably 
adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental 
constitutional rights to the courts.”247  Thus, the Court held:  “[T]he 
fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires pris-
 
237 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
238 Id. at 824–25 (noting that it is “indisputable” that states must provide indigent inmates 
with paper and pen, notary services, and adequate postage to prepare and file legal pa-
pers, forgo docket fees and pay for transcripts, and pay for assistance of trial and appel-
late counsel). 
239 Id. at 825. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 825–26. 
242 Id. at 826. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. at 827–28. 
245 Id. at 830–31. 
246 Id. at 830–32. 
247 Id. at 825. 
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on authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of mea-
ningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libra-
ries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.”248 
In so holding, the Court dismissed as “irrelevant” the state prac-
tice of appointing counsel in post-conviction proceedings where the 
petitioner’s claims survive initial judicial review.  Rather, the core 
concern underlying the access right is “protecting the ability of an 
inmate to prepare a petition or complaint,” that is, securing a foot in 
the courthouse door in the first place.249 
In dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, 
accused the majority of creating “the ‘fundamental constitutional 
right of access to the courts’ . . . virtually out of whole cloth with little 
or no reference to the Constitution from which it is supposed to be 
derived.”250  Justice Rehnquist warned that “[i]f ‘meaningful access’ to 
the courts is to include law libraries, there is no convincing reason 
why it should not also include lawyers appointed at the expense of 
the State.”251  “Just as a library may assist some inmates in filing papers 
which contain more than the bare factual allegations of injustice,” the 
dissent reasoned, “appointment of counsel would assure that the le-
gal arguments advanced are made with some degree of sophistica-
tion.”252 
D. The Right of Access, Post-Bounds 
In 1987, the Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s claim in Pennsyl-
vania v. Finley that the “equal protection guarantee of ‘meaningful 
access’” requires assistance of counsel during state post-conviction 
proceedings.253  In Finley, the petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition 
in state trial court, raising the issues her appointed counsel had 
raised on direct appeal to the state supreme court.254  The trial court 
 
248 Id. at 828. 
249 Id. at 828 n.17 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
250 Id. at 840 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 828). 
251 Id. at 841. 
252 Id. 
253 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987).  More precisely, petitioner argued that, notwithstanding a lack 
of a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, once the state appoints counsel, the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires counsel’s actions to comport 
with the Anders v. California procedures.  Id.  Anders in turn requires that appointed 
counsel who seeks to withdraw based on a failure to identify any potentially meritorious 
issues file an accompanying brief that identifies all ostensibly arguable issues.  Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45 (1967).  This process ensures judicial review of the me-
rits of the appeal before deciding whether to grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and 
thus, protects appellant’s constitutional right to counsel.  Id. 
254 Finley, 481 U.S. at 553. 
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denied relief, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, order-
ing that petitioner receive assistance of counsel in her post-conviction 
proceedings.255  After a review of the record, petitioner’s attorney in-
formed the court that there were no arguable bases for relief and 
thus, asked to be relieved as counsel.256  The trial court agreed with 
counsel’s assessment and granted the motion to withdraw from re-
presentation.257 
With new appointed counsel, petitioner appealed the trial court’s 
judgment.258  The state appeals court held that prior counsel had 
been ineffective in moving to withdraw without briefing potential is-
sues as required by Anders v. California,259 and remanded for further 
proceedings.260  The Supreme Court reversed, finding Anders inap-
plicable because it derives from a constitutional right to counsel, 
which does not exist in state post-conviction proceedings.261  The 
Court observed that “the right to appointed counsel extends to the 
first appeal of right, and no further.”262  Moreover, “the defendant’s 
access to the trial record and the appellate briefs and opinions pro-
vided sufficient tools for the pro se litigant to gain meaningful access 
to courts” for both discretionary appellate review and post-conviction 
proceedings.263 
Two years after Finley, the Supreme Court issued a plurality opi-
nion in Murray v. Giarratano, holding that petitioners in capital cases 
do not have an access-to-the-courts right to counsel in state post-
conviction proceedings.264  In Giarratano, Virginia’s death row inmates 
filed a civil rights suit arguing that assistance of counsel was required 
in order “to enjoy their constitutional right to access to the courts in 






259 386 U.S. 738, 742–45 (1967). 
260 Finley, 481 U.S. at 554.  Because the right to assistance of counsel encompasses the right 
to effective assistance of counsel, when counsel renders ineffective assistance, the aggrieved 
client is entitled to provision of a remedy.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
684–86 (1984) (recognizing ineffective assistance of trial counsel as a Sixth Amendment 
violation); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) (recognizing due process and equal 
protection right to counsel on direct appeal requires effective assistance of counsel); see al-
so Garcia Uhrig, supra note 15, at 559–63 (analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel doc-
trine). 
261 Finley, 481 U.S. at 559. 
262 Id. at 555. 
263 Id. at 557. 
264 492 U.S. 1 (1989). 
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Smith.265  State prison facilities in Virginia allowed death row inmates 
restricted use of law libraries and appointed a number of staff attor-
neys to the various penal institutions to assist inmates with incarcera-
tion-related litigation.266 
The district court concluded that several special considerations 
warranted greater assistance to inmates than outlined in Bounds.267  
Specifically, in light of their pending execution, death row inmates 
have limited time within which to prepare post-conviction petitions, 
their cases are exceptionally complex, and the psychological effect of 
their death sentences impairs the ability to perform their own legal 
work.268  The Fourth Circuit, en banc, affirmed the district court’s 
remedial order.269  In so holding, the appellate court concluded that 
Pennsylvania v. Finley was not controlling because Finley was not a 
“meaningful access” case, did not address the rule enunciated in 
Bounds v. Smith, and, “most significantly,” was not a death penalty 
case.270 
The Supreme Court reversed, affirming Finley, which, in disa-
greement with the Fourth Circuit, it characterized as in fact involving 
meaningful access to the courts: 
The Court of Appeals . . . relied on what it perceived as a tension be-
tween the rule in Finley and the implication of our decision in Bounds v. 
Smith . . . ; we find no such tension.  Whether the right of access at issue 
in Bounds is primarily one of due process or equal protection, in either 
case it rests on a constitutional theory considered in Finley.271 
Thus, the plurality observed that to interpret Bounds as requiring the 
provision of assistance of counsel to capital inmates would require at 
least partially overruling Finley based on the district court’s factual 
conclusions regarding the unique nature of capital cases.272  Instead, 
the Court extended Finley to capital inmates, in so doing noting that 
its “holding necessarily imposes limits on Bounds.”273 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor, writing separately, 
concurred in the judgment.274  As a threshold matter, he noted: 
It cannot be denied that collateral relief proceedings are a central part of 
the review process for prisoners sentenced to death.  As Justice Stevens 
 
265 Id. at 3–4; Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). 
266 Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 5. 
267 Id. at 3–6. 
268 Id. at 4. 
269 Giarratano v. Murray, 847 F.2d 1118, 1122 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc). 
270 Id. 
271 Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 11 (internal citations omitted). 
272 Id. at 11–12. 
273 Id. at 12. 
274 Id. at 14 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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observes [in dissent], a substantial proportion of these prisoners succeed 
in having their death sentences vacated in habeas corpus proceedings.  
The complexity of our jurisprudence in this area, moreover, makes it un-
likely that capital defendants will be able to file successful petitions for 
collateral relief without the assistance of persons learned in the law.275 
But Justice Kennedy also underscored that states have considerable 
discretion in implementing measures that secure meaningful access 
to the courts for its inmates, as required by Bounds.276  And significant-
ly, despite the lack of formal provision for appointment of counsel in 
capital cases, “no prisoner on death row in Virginia has been unable 
to obtain counsel to represent him in post-conviction proceedings.”277  
Additionally, Virginia’s penal institutions employ staff attorneys to as-
sist inmates with post-conviction pleadings.278  Thus, Justice Kennedy 
in his concurrence concluded that he was “not prepared to say that 
this scheme violates the Constitution.”279 
Seven years after Giarratano, the Supreme Court modified Bounds 
in Lewis v. Casey.280  In Casey, Arizona state inmates brought a civil 
rights action under Bounds v. Smith, challenging the adequacy of the 
state’s prison law library and legal assistance program.281  The district 
court granted injunctive relief on the ground that the prison system 
failed to comply with the constitutional standards set forth under 
Bounds.282  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Bounds violation finding 
and, for the most part, the terms of the injunction.283 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded due to the district 
court’s “failure to identify anything more than isolated instances of 
actual injury.”284  In so holding, the Court read into Bounds an actual-
injury requirement.  The Court emphasized that Bounds did not 
“create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assis-
tance” and thus, “an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury 
simply by establishing that his prison’s law library or legal assistance 
program is subpar in some theoretical sense.”285  Rather, the Court in 
Lewis held that, to show a violation of the constitutional right to 
access to the courts, an inmate must demonstrate that the prison’s al-
 
275 Id. (citation omitted). 
276 Id. 
277 Id. 
278 Id. at 14–15. 
279 Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
280 518 U.S. 343 (1996). 
281 Id. at 346. 
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283 Id. at 348. 
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leged deficient library or legal assistance resources “hindered his ef-
forts to pursue a legal claim.”286 
He might show, for example, that a complaint he prepared was dismissed 
for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of defi-
ciencies in the prison’s legal assistance facilities, he could not have 
known.  Or that he had suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished 
to bring before the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law 
library that he was unable even to file a complaint.287 
The Court also modified Bounds’s apparent expansion of the right 
of access recognized in earlier cases, “which was a right to bring to 
court a grievance that the inmate wished to present.”288  Specifically, 
the Court disclaimed Bounds’s suggestion that “the State must enable 
the prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate effectively once in 
court.”289  The Court concluded:  “To demand the conferral of such 
sophisticated legal capabilities upon a mostly uneducated and indeed 
largely illiterate prison population is effectively to demand perma-
nent provision of counsel, which we do not believe the Constitution 
requires.”290  In short, Lewis made clear that the access right is merely 
the right to get a foot in the courthouse door, not a right to substan-
tive assistance with one’s case.291  At the same time, the right necessar-
ily implicates a substantive component, which is inherent in the right 
to have access to a law library or other legal assistance. 
After Lewis, the precise parameters of the access-to-the-courts right 
as applied to pro se habeas litigants remain imprecise.  At a mini-
mum, before enactment of AEDPA and its concomitant procedural 
strictures, the Supreme Court had declined to hold that the access 
right encompasses a right to assistance of counsel.292  For death row 
inmates, however, Justice Kennedy, with Justice O’Connor joining, 
premised his vote on the fact that no Virginia death row inmate had 
in fact been denied assistance of counsel.293  Hence, the issue is argu-




288 Id. at 354 (citing Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 547–48 (1941); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 




292 See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). 
293 Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 14–15. 
294 See Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano Is a Scarecrow:  The Right to Counsel in State Capital Post-
conviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079, 1081, 1089–91 (2006) (arguing that 
“Giarratano has been seriously overread” in that “[t]he controlling opinion of Justice 
Kennedy recognizes that capital post-conviction petitioners have a right to counsel in cer-
tain circumstances” in existence in current death penalty litigation). 
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that the access right is an inherently flexible one, with states possess-
ing broad discretion as to how to implement it.  In Lewis, the Court 
also underscored that the right encompasses only the ability to get 
one’s foot in the courthouse door, rather than to discover and actual-
ly litigate claims in a petition. 
But the dramatic change in federal habeas law brought by enact-
ment of AEDPA in 1996 changed the relevant legal landscape and 
now calls for re-examination of the issue.  Even for non-capital in-
mates, AEDPA’s complex array of procedural requirements—in par-
ticular, the statute’s one-year statute of limitations and its interplay 
with other procedural doctrine—have placed the Great Writ out of 
reach for many pro se inmates.  Absent repeal of AEDPA, this new 
landscape, particularly as illuminated by the federal courts since 
AEDPA’s enactment, necessitates recognition of a constitutional right 
to assistance of counsel in deciphering the myriad filing require-
ments and thus, gaining access to federal court review. 
III.  THE ACCESS-TO-THE-COURTS DEMAND FOR COUNSEL IN POST-
AEDPA LITIGATION 
As discussed, the constitutional right of access to the courts for 
habeas petitioners is still fairly amorphous in dimension.  In the ab-
sence of assistance of counsel, the early cases, Johnson v. Avery295 and 
Younger v. Gilmore,296 affirm the essential role of jailhouse lawyers 
and/or adequate law libraries in ensuring access to the courts for in-
digent habeas petitioners.  But after AEDPA, such alternate resources 
no longer suffice to protect the indigent inmate’s right to access to 
the courts.  Fellow inmates self-taught in federal habeas corpus are 
generally no match for the rigor and intricacies of AEDPA’s shifting 
procedural demands.  Nor will access to a prison law library without 
legal assistance enable the average pro se inmate to gain adequate in-
sight into AEDPA’s myriad procedural requirements in order to fend 
for himself.  As analyzed supra,297 AEDPA’s murkiest issues lie hidden 
beneath the spare language of the statute itself and require extensive 
research and analysis to excavate. 
Likewise, the right to counsel jurisprudence, as merged with the 
access right, should not control.  This case law only considers the role 
of counsel in researching and framing the substance of claims in dis-
cretionary appeals and state habeas proceedings.  The Supreme 
 
295 393 U.S. 483 (1969). 
296 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam). 
297  See supra Part II.C–D. 
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Court ultimately concluded that where inmates are simply repeating 
claims previously developed and litigated with counsel’s assistance, 
the Constitution does not demand assistance of counsel.298  But none 
of this jurisprudence considers the barrier to access that AEDPA’s in-
ordinate procedural complexity now poses to pro se litigants, sepa-
rate and apart from the substance of the claims for which the inmate 
seeks the writ of habeas corpus. 
In Bounds v. Smith, the Court identified substantive content to the 
access right, finding its core to be “protecting the ability of an inmate 
to prepare a petition or complaint.”299  As discussed, with Lewis v. Ca-
sey, the Supreme Court retreated from this interpretation, holding 
that “access” signifies only the right to get one’s foot in the court-
house door, rather than to possess full litigation capability once in-
side.300  The Court underscored the need for states to have flexibility 
in implementing the right, withholding recognition of a right to 
counsel to guarantee that access. 
While such flexibility may have sufficed constitutionally to protect 
Lewis’s more limited access right in the pre-AEDPA era, the dramatic 
change to federal habeas practice that AEDPA wrought in 1996 now 
demands conferral of a right to counsel to federal habeas litigants.  
Indeed, the Court’s decision in Lewis contemplates the reality of post-
AEDPA habeas practice when it posits as an access violation the case 
where the court dismisses a pro se litigant’s petition due to failure to 
comply with a technical requirement that the litigant could not have 
known about, or where the inmate is unable to file for relief alto-
gether as a result of inadequate legal resources.301  In Lewis’s era, 
these hypotheticals represented the anomalous case.  But today, fed-
eral habeas practice epitomizes these examples in that AEDPA’s pro-
cedural complexity is all but incomprehensible to the average inmate, 
regardless of the quality of the library facilities available to him.  The 
Vanderbilt study finding that 22% of non-capital petitions are dis-
missed on timeliness grounds alone, with another 7% dismissed as 
successive and 13% of individual claims procedurally barred, bears 
this out.302  A copy of the governing statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2242, 2253–
2254, and a set of federal case reporters, though perhaps sufficient in 
pre-AEDPA practice, will not begin to unpack the intricacies of 
 
298 See supra Part II.D.  The Right of Access, Post-Bounds. 
299 430 U.S. 817, 828 n.17 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974)). 
300 Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828 & n.17. 
301 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). 
302 See HABEAS LITIGATION TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 77, at 57, 64. 
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AEDPA’s myriad requirements for the average pro se inmate.  In-
deed, federal courts have devoted substantial energy over the past fif-
teen years to distilling the actual mechanics of AEDPA’s procedural 
requirements, in particular, its statute of limitations.  Notwithstand-
ing the skill and experience of the federal bench, this process re-
mains a daunting one and the doctrine is far from settled. 
Without a lawyer, in sufficient time, an inmate might be able to ar-
ticulate his core concerns—e.g., “my lawyer didn’t talk to my alibi 
witness” or “the prosecutor didn’t give my lawyer all of the evi-
dence,”—and the judge, with a law clerk at hand, could typically fig-
ure out the underlying constitutional issues presented.303  But once 
the procedural barricade of AEDPA was erected and pro se inmates 
were required to navigate the intricacies of a short statute of limita-
tions, together with the exhaustion and procedural default doctrines 
and the new bar on successive petitions, the courthouse doors in ef-
fect slammed shut.  Most inmates, while perhaps capable of inartfully 
informing the court why they think they should not be behind bars, 
are not capable of navigating a very complicated set of procedural 
rules.  For these inmates, AEDPA has erected an impenetrable barrier 
to federal habeas review. 
Nor does removal of restrictions on inmates helping one another 
suffice, constitutionally.304  True, in time, some inmates might be able 
to educate themselves to a point at which their knowledge rivals, if 
not surpasses, professional counsel.305  But without systemic provision 
 
303 Where the inmate can show prejudice, defense counsel’s failure to interview viable alibi 
witnesses may violate the Sixth Amendment, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984) (setting forth test for Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
claim); see, e.g., Griffin v. Warden, Md. Corr. Adjustment Ctr., 970 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 
1992) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to interview alibi wit-
nesses).  The prosecutor’s failure to turn over to the defense potentially exculpatory evi-
dence would violate the Due Process Clause.  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 91 
(1963) (White, J., writing separately).  Nonetheless, separate due process and equal pro-
tection concerns arguably dictate a right to counsel for claims raised in the first instance 
in habeas corpus.  See Garcia Uhrig, supra note 15, at 559–63 (articulating a substantive, 
claims-based right to assistance of counsel in habeas corpus for claims raised in the first 
instance in habeas proceedings). 
304 See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969) (finding state prison regulation prohibit-
ing inmate assistance in preparing state habeas petitions violates constitutional right to 
denial of access to access-to-the-courts in absence of any alternative to such assistance). 
305 See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2565 (2010) (remanding for determination of 
whether inmate entitled to equitable tolling of statute of limitations based on counsel’s 
extraordinary incompetence where inmate, himself demonstrated enormous diligence in 
attempting to file his petition on time despite counsel’s failures); O’Bryant, supra note 
138, at 315 (illustrating sophisticated understanding of AEDPA’s procedural require-
ments, yet noting such understanding came too late to assist in his own case, which was 
dismissed as time-barred for failure to file within the requisite one year). 
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of competent legal assistance or a remedy for the lack thereof, too 
many inmates will come up short, with little correlation in case out-
come to the actual merits of their cases.  Denial of counsel in modern 
federal habeas practice is akin to denial of access to the jailhouse law-
yer and/or an adequate prison law library in the pre-AEDPA world. 
Lewis seems to hold that a petitioner can show an access violation 
only after the fact and only where he was denied review of an arguably 
valid claim.306  This would preclude relief for inmates who are unable 
to identify potentially meritorious claims that they would have raised 
in a procedurally barred habeas petition.  It would also preclude any 
injunctive relief or provision of counsel before dismissal of a habeas 
petition.  The Court has not shed additional light on this aspect of its 
decision since Lewis.  But such holding stands in direct conflict with 
access-to-the-courts jurisprudence.  As discussed, Bounds merged the 
decisions that involved literal impediments to indigent filing—e.g., 
filing fees, prison official screening of petitions, and unavailability of 
trial transcripts to pro se litigants—with right to counsel jurispru-
dence, all of which define the right of access as entirely independent 
of the merits of the petitioner’s case.  Rather, the essence of the right 
is merely the ability to present one’s case before the judiciary, regard-
less of the ultimate outcome.  Hence, to the extent Lewis requires 
more, the decision should be overruled as at odds with decades of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
Regardless, after Lewis, it is clear that the right of access at most 
means a right to assistance of counsel in clearing AEDPA’s procedur-
al hurdles to federal habeas review.  It does not contemplate assis-
tance of counsel in researching and framing those claims.307  Thus, a 
right to post-conviction counsel based on access doctrine would ex-
tend only to penetrating the procedural thicket cultivated by AEDPA 
and no farther. 
There are a number of methods that could serve to fulfill this con-
stitutional mandate.  Specifically, federal courts could:  (1) provide 
counsel to assist indigent inmates in navigating AEDPA’s procedural 
requirements and filing the petition within the provided one-year 
time period as well as a remedy where attorney error causes dismissal 
of a petition on procedural grounds; (2) where provision of counsel 
 
306 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996).  
307 Petitioners may find a constitutional right to counsel in researching, identifying, and liti-
gating the substance of claims for which habeas corpus provides the first forum for review 
based on distinct due process and equal protection considerations.  See Garcia Uhrig, su-
pra note 15, at 598–600 (articulating a substantive, claims-based right to assistance of 
counsel in habeas corpus for claims raised in the first instance in habeas proceedings). 
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is impractical, simply provide a remedy to petitioners where they fail 
to satisfy AEDPA’s myriad procedural requirements for reasons other 
than lack of due diligence; (3) recognize ineffective assistance of 
counsel or denial of counsel altogether as a basis for statutory or 
equitable relief from AEDPA’s strictures; or (4) enact policy reforms 
either to reduce the number of inmates pursuing the writ of habeas 
corpus or to repeal AEDPA’s procedural requirements, in particular, 
the one-year statute of limitations and rigid bar to successive peti-
tions, altogether. 
A. Providing Counsel 
To implement an access right to counsel, the federal government 
can invoke the ready structure of the federal public defenders’ offices 
and/or federal panels for court-appointed counsel.  Indeed, some 
federal public defenders offices already staff attorneys competent in 
AEDPA’s intricacies and pitfalls as a result of capital defense prac-
tice.308  As a matter of course, inmates whose convictions are affirmed 
on direct appeal would receive consultation with counsel regarding 
the post-conviction process.  If an inmate indicates interest in pur-
suing post-conviction relief, counsel would advise him of the proce-
dural requirements under AEDPA.  Counsel would also advise state 
inmates regarding the role state post-conviction proceedings play in 
properly exhausting any claims presented in a federal petition and in 
tolling AEDPA’s statute of limitations.  In practice, implementation of 
the right would mimic the constitutional right to counsel on direct 
appeal, albeit counsel’s role would be a more limited one.  Rather 
than be tasked with preparing, filing, and litigating appellate briefs, 
counsel’s role would be only to educate the inmate on AEDPA’s re-
quirements to ensure that the inmate is not denied habeas review 
based on failure to comprehend and navigate AEDPA’s procedural 
requirements. 
 
308 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (providing for right to counsel in federal post-
conviction proceedings); 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (2006) (requiring more stringent experience 
criteria for counsel appointed in capital post-conviction proceedings than non-capital 
proceedings). 
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B.  Providing a Remedy for Ineffective Assistance of Post-conviction Counsel 
1. The Constitutional Requirement of Effective Assistance of Counsel 
It is well-established that the constitutional rights to counsel at tri-
al and on direct appeal guarantee rights to effective assistance of coun-
sel.309  Where counsel renders ineffective assistance, a defendant may 
seek relief, usually in post-conviction proceedings, from the conse-
quences of that incompetence.  In Strickland v. Washington, the Su-
preme Court set forth a two-part test for establishing constitutionally 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel:  first, the defendant must show 
that defense counsel acted unreasonably, that is, contrary to “prevail-
ing professional norms.”310  Second, the defendant must show preju-
dice:  that there is a “reasonable probability” that the result of the 
proceeding would have been different if defense counsel had per-
formed competently.311  In Evitts v. Lucey, the Court recognized that 
the constitutional right to counsel on direct appeal likewise requires 
effective assistance of counsel, for which the Strickland test informs 
the remedy.312 
Similarly, recognition of a constitutional right to counsel in filing 
a first federal habeas petition would require a remedy for procedural 
errors that are attributable to attorney incompetence or lack of coun-
sel altogether.  Thus, where the petitioner demonstrates that coun-
sel’s assistance was professionally unreasonable, or denied altogether, 
and that one or more of AEDPA’s procedural hurdles precluded ha-
beas review of his claims as a result, he would be entitled to relief.  
Such relief could obtain by relieving the inmate from the preclusive 
strictures of the procedural doctrine at issue.  Thus, for example, the 
district court would review the substantive claims in an otherwise 
time-barred petition, a procedurally defaulted claim, and/or a 
second or successive petition, containing claim(s) overlooked or ex-
cluded in the first petition due to attorney error or failure to provide 
assistance of counsel altogether.313 
 
309 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (describing the Sixth Amendment right 
to effective assistance of counsel); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (set-
ting forth test for establishing denial of constitutional right to counsel); Evitts v. Lucey, 
469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) (recognizing due process and equal protection right to counsel 
on direct appeal requires effective assistance of counsel). 
310 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (1984). 
311 Id. at 692, 694. 
312 469 U.S. at 396–99. 
313 Where attorney error or lack of legal assistance altogether causes omission of a claim 
from a first 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, thus requiring petitioner to file a second or succes-
sive petition, the only relief available would apply within an ineffective assistance of coun-
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2. Statutory and Equitable Relief from AEDPA’s Strictures 
a. Relief from the Statute of Limitations 
As discussed, AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is responsi-
ble for the majority of the federal habeas petitions that federal courts 
deny for procedural reasons, rather than on the merits.314  Recogni-
tion of a right to counsel based on access to the courts would mean 
that, where counsel fails to advise an inmate accurately regarding the 
calculation of the one-year period, two doctrines could supply an in-
mate with relief. 
First, the government’s failure to provide effective assistance of 
counsel would constitute an “impediment to filing” and thus, a basis 
for statutory tolling, under § 2244(d)(1)(B).  Indeed, some federal 
courts have already recognized that a state’s failure to provide an in-
mate with a copy of the federal habeas statute as revised under 
AEDPA constitutes an impediment and therefore justifies statutory 
tolling of the statute of limitations for the period during which the 
impediment existed.315  Thus, where competent counsel is unavailable 
to assist an inmate in comprehending and navigating the statute of 
limitations within the defined year, the statute of limitations would be 
tolled until the inmate receives this assistance. 
Second, a lack of competent post-conviction counsel could pro-
vide a basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.  The 
plight of the pro se inmate in filing within the statute of limitations 
has already found some traction in equitable tolling doctrine.  For 
example, federal courts have applied equitable tolling where counsel 
fails to return a petitioner’s file in time to enable the petitioner to 
timely file his federal petition316 or where the prison library lacks even 
 
sel framework because the substantive criteria under AEDPA for filing a second or succes-
sive petition is limited, in relevant part, to claims showing actual innocence.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(2) (2006). 
314 See HABEAS LITIGATION TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 77, at 8–9 (explaining how 
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations was a significant departure from the much less 
stringent timely filing rule that predated AEDPA); id. at 46, 57 (providing statistics and 
analysis of the number of habeas cases dismissed as time-barred under the one-year sta-
tute of limitations). 
315 See supra note 59 (citing circuit court decisions which have addressed whether a state’s 
failure to make available to inmates legal materials pertaining to AEDPA constitutes an 
impediment to filing for tolling purposes).  As argued in this Article, these cases do not 
go far enough.  Providing a typical inmate with a copy of the revised statutes provides at 
best superficial exposure to an enormously complicated body of law, one which has 
evolved primarily through judicial decisions. 
316 See Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 957–58, 962 (9th Cir. 2010) (remanding for district 
court to develop facts to determine whether equitable tolling appropriate based on ha-
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a copy of AEDPA.317  Most recently, the Supreme Court held that ex-
traordinary ineffective assistance of court-appointed post-conviction 
counsel, which resulted in a time-barred federal petition in a capital 
case, may justify equitable tolling.318  But thus far, courts have de-
clined to apply equitable tolling based on “ordinary” ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.319  Recognition of an access-based right to counsel 
would provide a basis for equitable tolling where a petitioner files his 
petition outside the one-year period of time as a result of misappre-
hension of the requirements of the statute of limitations, based in 
turn on denial of counsel or incompetent assistance of counsel.320 
Recognition of an access right to counsel would not offer relief 
from the exhaustion requirement.  But with statutory and equitable 
tolling available based on post-conviction counsel’s error, a state peti-
tioner who fails to exhaust all federal claims due to incompetent 
counsel would remain able to return to state court to finish exhaust-
ing his claims without being time-barred from re-filing under AEDPA. 
b. Relief from Procedural Default Doctrine 
Similarly, even absent a miscarriage of justice, recognition of an 
access right to counsel would enable a petitioner to pursue claims 
that are otherwise procedurally defaulted to the extent the default is 
the result of faulty advice by post-conviction counsel or denial of 
counsel altogether and the petitioner would suffer prejudice as a re-
 
beas counsel’s failure to return case file in time to enable petitioner to timely file his 
§ 2254 petition); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding equitable 
tolling appropriate based on habeas counsel’s failure to file § 2254 petition or return pe-
titioner’s file throughout the duration of the limitations period and two months beyond).  
Cf. Ford v. Pliler, 590 F.3d 782, 790 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying equitable tolling based on 
counsel’s failure to return case file because petitioner had not shown failure caused him 
to miss the one-year deadline). 
317 See Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (remanding for district 
court to develop facts to determine whether unavailability of AEDPA in prison law library 
was an “impediment” to petitioner’s filing, and whether it provides grounds for equitable 
tolling of the statute of limitations). 
318 See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2564–65 (2010) (explaining that the facts in this 
case suggest an “extraordinary instance in which petitioner’s attorney’s conduct consti-
tuted far more than garden variety or excusable neglect”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
319 Id. at 2564 (explaining that a “garden variety” claim of attorney negligence does not war-
rant equitable tolling). 
320 Inmates who miss the deadline only as a result of their own lack of due diligence would 
not qualify for equitable tolling.  See id. at 2562 (noting that equitable tolling applies only 
if petitioner shows:  “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that 
some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.”) (quot-
ing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). 
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sult.321  As discussed,322 under AEDPA, the procedural default doctrine 
permits review of otherwise defaulted claims where a petitioner can 
demonstrate cause and prejudice or actual innocence.323  The Su-
preme Court has not clearly defined either “cause” or “prejudice.”324  
Although the Court has not articulated a comprehensive list of cir-
cumstances that qualify as “cause,”325 such event generally must be 
“some objective factor external to the defense.”326  Nonetheless, the 
Court has recognized as sufficient cause situations in which the State 
impeded or prevented compliance with the procedural rule in ques-
tion327 or where defense counsel error caused the default at a stage 
where petitioner was constitutionally or statutorily entitled to effec-
tive assistance of counsel.328  Similarly, “cause” to excuse a procedural 
default arises where the State denies petitioner a constitutional or sta-
tutory right to counsel altogether, thus forcing him to proceed pro 
se.329 
In the past year, the Supreme Court has signaled a receptivity to 
providing equitable relief from procedural default strictures based on 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel.  First, in Maples v. 
Thomas, the Court recognized as “cause” to excuse procedural default 
the abandonment of a death penalty petitioner by state post-
conviction counsel, without notice to the petitioner or leave of 
court.330  As such, assuming prejudice, recognition of an access-to-the-
courts right to assistance of counsel in federal habeas proceedings 
would qualify as “cause” to excuse procedural defaults caused by ei-
 
321 Where state post-conviction procedures are sufficiently complex, the access right also may 
requires assistance of counsel in navigating those hurdles. 
322 See supra text accompanying notes 143–150 (explaining the procedural default doctrine). 
323 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (establishing the “cause and prejudice” 
rule for procedural default doctrine); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 
(1991) (finding state post-conviction counsel’s late filing of appeal in capital case does 
not constitute “cause” to excuse procedural default). 
324 See 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 40, at §§ 26.3[b], [c] (discussing the imprecise defini-
tions of “cause” and “prejudice,” respectively). 
325 Id. at § 26.3[b]; Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533–34 (1986). 
326 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 40, at § 26.3[b]; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 
(1986). 
327 See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691–98 (2004) (finding state’s failure to disclose excul-
patory evidence under Maryland v. Brady qualified as “cause”); Strickler v. Greene, 527 
U.S. 263, 283, 289 (1999) (same). 
328 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753–54 (1991) (”Where a petitioner defaults a 
claim as a result of the denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel, the 
State . . . must bear the cost of any resulting default . . . .”). 
329 See id. at 755–56 (explaining that indigent criminal defendants have a right to counsel in 
their first appeal of right). 
330 Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 927–28 (2012).  
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ther attorney error or a federal habeas petitioner’s pro se status.331  
Most recently, in Martinez v. Ryan, the Court held the failure of state 
post-conviction counsel to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, or of the State to provide post-conviction counsel to do so in 
the first instance, where under state law post-conviction proceedings 
are the first forum available to litigate such claims, provides “cause” 
to excuse any resulting procedural default in federal court.332  In so 
holding, the Court underscored the vital role counsel plays in navi-
gating habeas proceedings substantively.333  Equitable relief based on 
recognition of a limited, access-to-the-courts right to counsel would 
mimic in function the remedy recognized in Maples and Martinez, al-
beit with broader application to all procedural errors by pro se liti-
gants, other than those caused by lack of diligence, that result in pro-
cedural default. 
c. Policy-Based Reforms 
As anyone who does death penalty work can attest, states have 
failed miserably at providing adequate, effective assistance of counsel 
to criminal defendants at trial and on direct appeal.334  The situation 
has only grown worse with escalating rates of incarceration and na-
tionwide state budget crises.  Thus, at least under the criminal justice 
system as currently configured, providing attorneys in all federal post-
conviction proceedings may well be financially untenable.  But as Jus-
tice Marshall observed in Bounds v. Smith, “the cost of protecting a 
constitutional right cannot justify its total denial.”335  At least several 
possibilities exist to enable constitutional compliance without public 
financial ruin. 
First, because inmates must still be “in custody” as well as have 
completed the direct appellate process in order to file a federal ha-
beas petition, federal habeas petitioners are typically those serving 
long sentences.  Thus, a good starting point would be to re-evaluate 
the state sentencing codes.  Specifically, states could choose to incar-
cerate fewer people and for shorter periods of time by revisiting the 
misguided policies of the 1980s and 1990s that resulted in the large-
 
331 See Maples v. Thomas, 586 F.3d 879, cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1718 (2011) (granting review 
to determine whether capital habeas counsel’s abandonment of petitioner, in part, con-
stitutes cause to excuse procedural default). 
332 Martinez v. Ryan, No. 10-1001, 2012 WL 912950 (Mar. 20, 2012). 
333 Id. at *7–8. 
334 See supra text accompanying notes 6–8. 
335 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977). 
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scale incarceration of the American people.336  This approach would 
free up resources throughout the criminal justice system without 
compromising its integrity. 
Second, states could simply decline to provide counsel to inmates 
as required under an access doctrine but instead, provide the equita-
ble or statutory relief from AEDPA’s procedural strictures as articu-
lated above. 
Lastly, and perhaps most simply, Congress could repeal AEDPA.  
Indeed, I suspect that if the Supreme Court were to recognize an 
access-based constitutional right to counsel in light of AEDPA’s pro-
cedural complexities, repeal of AEDPA’s statute of limitations would 
quickly follow. 
CONCLUSION 
In the trial context, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
“[w]hile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are 
expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a 
sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators.”337  What has emerged in 
federal habeas practice for non-capital, pro se litigants is precisely 
such a slaughter.  In the absence of a right to assistance of counsel, 
the myriad procedural requirements under AEDPA render too many 
pro se litigants helpless in pursuit of the Great Writ, effectively deny-
ing them their right of access to the courts.  The effect of denying as-
sistance of counsel in ascertaining and complying with AEDPA’s one-
year statute of limitations and accompanying procedural rules is no 
less potent an impediment to judicial review than the obstacles struck 
down in the access cases.  Thus, absent the fortuity of competent jail-
house counsel, the average pro se inmate lacks an “adequate oppor-
 
336 See PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100:  BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 5 (2008), 
available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/One%20in%20100.pdf 
(finding one in one hundred—or 2.3 million—adults in the United States are now be-
hind bars, making the United States the world leader in incarceration rates); Naomi Mu-
rakawa & Katherine Beckett, The Penology of Racial Innocence:  The Erasure of Racism in the 
Study and Practice of Punishment, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 695, 699 (2010) (discussing the Pew 
Center study’s findings); see generally Michael Tonry, Why Are U.S. Incarceration Rates So 
High?, 45 CRIM. & DELINQ. 419 (1999) (exploring explanations for dramatic increase in 
U.S. incarceration rates since the 1970s, including the drug war declared in the 1980s and 
increasing popularity of recidivist statutes such as California’s three-strikes law). 
337 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
Cronic, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s presumption of ineffectiveness 
where a young and inexperienced trial counsel had only twenty-five days to prepare a 
complex, serious case and some witnesses were not easily accessible.  Id. at 664–67. 
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tunity to present his claims fairly” in federal habeas proceedings.338  
Without assistance of counsel in navigating through AEDPA’s proce-
dural thicket, the pro se petitioner must shoot into the dark at what 
has revealed itself to be an elusive and moving target.  When he mi-
sapprehends the strictures of AEDPA, the courthouse doors slam 
shut, often with no remedy available to reopen them. 
In short, the reality of post-AEDPA habeas practice demands rec-
ognition of a right to counsel to ensure the indigent litigant’s access 
to the courts.  A right to counsel based on access-to-the-courts doc-
trine is an inherently limited one in that, after Lewis v. Casey, the right 
of access guarantees nothing more than gaining literal entrance 
through the courthouse door.339  Hence, if recognized, such a right 
would require competent legal assistance for indigent inmates in na-
vigating and comprehending AEDPA’s procedural requirements, but 
nothing more.  This right, combined with the equal protection and 
due process right outlined in my first article, A Case for a Constitutional 
Right to Counsel in Habeas Corpus,340 which would attach to all claims 
for which habeas corpus functions as a first appeal of right, combine 
to provide the indigent litigant with a meaningful opportunity to pur-
sue the Great Writ. 
 
338 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756 (1991) (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 
616 (1974). 
339 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996). 
340 60 HASTINGS L.J. 541 (2009). 
